

CURRENT *History*

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CURRENT History

OCTOBER, 1963

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This issue is devoted to an assessment of contemporary Russian policies. Does the new test ban treaty signal a change in the climate of the cold war? Discussing East-West negotiations for a disarmament agreement, our introductory article warns that "... an agreement to cease tests standing alone and not leading to more extensive agreements [will not] do much to limit the arms race or lessen the menace of nuclear war." Nonetheless, "it seems probable that the next step in the direction of limiting the arms race may be a package proposal containing some political agreements."

The Soviet Attitude toward Disarmament

By BERNHARD G. BECHHOEFER

Author of "Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control"

I

IN ATTEMPTING to determine the "attitude" of the Soviet Union toward disarmament, as well as toward any other significant phase of its foreign policy, there are several possible approaches.

Nothing pricks one's curiosity more than the inner operations of a power system. And in the case of Russia the incentive to speculate on "what really goes on" in the councils of the Kremlin is enhanced by the supersecrecy in which the highest level of Soviet politics is enveloped, by the dramatic shifts of policy and sudden displacements of leading personalities, and by a natural apprehension about the operations of a totalitarian regime which may at any moment threaten or transform our daily lives.¹

The approach of trying to find out "what really goes on" in the field of disarmament would almost certainly be a fruitless exercise in speculation. Even if we could guess cor-

rectly, the results might not have much validity. It seems clear that there is more to the study of Soviet policy than the mental exercise of analyzing obscure signposts indicating behavior and thinking within the Kremlin.

An equally futile approach, but one which is frequently followed, would be to examine in detail the various public disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union in order to assemble a series of detailed positions which could be described as "The Soviet Attitude toward Disarmament." Such an analysis would develop certain clichés which are often in conflict with each other. Some of them are: "Control without disarmament is espionage"; "Why should the Soviet Union disclose secrets of its rocket weapons which are superior to those of the United States while United States foreign bases continue to menace the U.S.S.R."; "Since the Soviet Union possesses many qualified technical personnel, why not use them for staffing inspection posts upon Soviet territory"; "An international police force, which takes its orders from the West-

¹Adam B. Ulam, *The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism* (1963), p. 91.

ern-dominated UN, could be used for unwarranted intrusion into the domestic affairs of nations and particularly into those affairs of the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries."²

These are samples of more recent clichés. An entirely different group of clichés could be developed for 1957, and still another set for 1952 or 1949 or 1946.

The conclusion of a critical study stemming from the multiplication of the apparent contradictions of the Soviet positions would almost certainly be that the Soviet Union has no serious interest in disarmament or even in limiting the arms race but utilizes the disarmament negotiations solely for propaganda purposes.³ On the other hand, an uncritical assembly of the same materials would create a dialectic monster. In fact, both conclusions would almost certainly be incorrect. Indeed, a similarly conducted study of Sino-Soviet relationships would probably reach the conclusion that the entire ideological conflict between the Russian and Chinese Communists is a sham.

A third (in some ways an intermediate) approach which this study will follow is to consider some of the main threads running through the disarmament negotiations, particularly those of the past five years, to ascertain in broad outline whether Soviet ideology would permit a workable agreement to limit the arms race. On the assumption that

the answer to this first question is affirmative, we shall then attempt the more difficult task of ascertaining the extent of Soviet willingness to reduce a broad agreement in principle to the specific and workable undertakings which alone can successfully limit the arms race.

II

It has often been pointed out that Communist doctrine "will be stretched to justify any practical needs of policy."⁴ Ideologically, the Soviet attitude toward disarmament could be governed by either of two apparently conflicting Marxian doctrines of the possibility of peaceful co-existence or the unavoidability of a clash sometime between the camps of socialism and capitalism.⁵

Over the years the Soviet attitude toward disarmament has in general placed increasing emphasis on the theme of peaceful co-existence.

During the period from 1946 to the death of Stalin, the main Soviet disarmament proposals were brief and little more than propaganda slogans: i.e., "... the prohibition of atomic weapons, the reduction of the armaments of Armed Forces in China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union by one-third within one year's time, and the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of a Control Commission to supervise the carrying out of these proposals."⁶ "The Security Council recognizes as essential the submission by states both of information on armed forces and conventional armaments and of information on atomic weapons."⁷

The Soviet leaders placed far greater emphasis on their mass propaganda appeals outside the United Nations—the Stockholm Appeal,⁸ the various "ban the bomb" campaigns which indeed continue to this day, the charge that the United States was waging bacteriological warfare in Korea.⁹

The slogan type of proposal reflected the emphasis of Stalin and his advisors on the inevitability of a clash between communism and capitalism. The chief purpose of disarmament discussions at that time was to create world sentiment which would inhibit

² Unpublished analysis of Soviet negotiations, by Thomas C. O'Sullivan, Raytheon Corporation.

³ John W. Spanier & Joseph L. Nogee, *The Politics of Disarmament—A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship*, Praeger, 1962.

⁴ Ulam, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁵ Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (1963), pp. 4-5.

⁶ "Soviet Draft Resolution Introduced in the General Assembly: Reduction of Armaments and Prohibition of Atomic Weapons," U. N. Doc. A/658 (Sept. 25, 1948). The revised version of this proposal was rejected by the General Assembly on Nov. 19, 1948.

⁷ *United States Participation in the United Nations, Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1949*, U. S. Department of State Publication 3765 (May, 1950), p. 81.

⁸ "Stockholm Appeal of the World Peace Council, March 19, 1950," in U. S. Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament*, Vol. I (1945-1956), Publication 7008 (August, 1960), p. 252.

⁹ U. S. Department of State, *United States Efforts Toward Disarmament*, Report, pp. 26-27.

the West from utilizing its nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union until the Soviet Union could develop nuclear strength.¹⁰

A CHANGING VIEWPOINT

The earliest indication of a changing Soviet viewpoint followed closely the Soviet achievement of a thermonuclear reaction on August 20, 1953 (which also was not long after the death of Stalin). Appropriately enough, in view of the conflict in Marxian doctrine, this indication took the form of a declaration by Khrushchev that "there is no fatal inevitability of war."¹¹ The only alternative to a nuclear war was peaceful co-existence. New social and political forces had come into being capable of preventing "the unleashing of war by the imperialists."

It was only a short doctrinal step from this public statement that war was not inevitable to further Soviet statements that a nuclear war would result in mutual annihilation. It is difficult to determine which position came first. Probably the Soviet realization of the destructive potential of nuclear weapons influenced or even caused the change of the Soviet emphasis on the inevitability of war. However, the statements of mutual an-

nihilation resulting from nuclear warfare obviously caused much greater practical difficulties in the military circles in the Kremlin and, therefore, were much slower to emerge. The process of their emergence is of great interest in gauging the Soviet attitude toward disarmament.

As early as 1954 Malenkov referred to "a new world slaughter which, with the contemporary means of warfare, means the destruction of world civilization."¹² However, only six weeks later, Malenkov apparently was forced to retract this statement with the suggestion that a new world war would "lead to the collapse of the Capitalist social system."¹³

Between 1956 and 1959, Bulganin and later Khrushchev made a number of statements to the effect that a thermonuclear war would result in the destruction of all civilization. However, it is notable that these statements were largely for foreign consumption.¹⁴ When Khrushchev addressed the United Nations on September 18, 1959, he asked dramatically: "Is it possible to disregard the fact that the destructive potential of the means of warfare has reached such tremendous proportions, and can one forget that there is not one spot on the globe today that is inaccessible to nuclear and rocket weapons?"

This acknowledgement to the world that a two-way mutual strike would result in mutual devastation resulted, a month later, in an article in *Red Star Moscow* that the Soviet Union could survive a nuclear first strike.¹⁵ This indicates an apparently unresolved issue at that time between Khrushchev and the military. The outlines of this issue and its ultimate resolution are clearly indicated in the recently published official Soviet statement of its strategic doctrine by Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, entitled "Soviet Military Strategy."

The military's hesitation to accept an estimate of mutual annihilation arose not from any conflicts with Marxian ideology but from the fact that a corollary apparently was that with greater emphasis on weapons of mass destruction, conventional military forces could be reduced.¹⁶ Khrushchev had not only in-

¹⁰ Lewis L. Strauss, *Men and Decisions* (1962), Chap. II, "Decision on the Hydrogen Bomb." See also Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (1958), Chap. 4, H. S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (1959), Chap. 1; and Shulman, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

¹¹ N. Khrushchev, Speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, February 14, 1956, in *Pravda* (Feb. 15, 1956, p. 3.) Cited by John S. Reshetar in testimony collected for Staff Study No. 8 of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Attitudes of Soviet Leaders Toward Disarmament," *Control and Reduction of Armaments*, Senate Report 2501, 85th Cong. 2nd Sess., pp. 335 ff.

¹² In *Pravda*, cited by Reshetar in Senate Report 2501, pp. 90-91.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ "Speech by N. A. Bulganin at a Bombay Meeting," *Soviet News* (Nov. 24, 1955), p. 7. See also "Communiqué on First Meeting of British and Soviet Leaders": statement issued by the Foreign Office after the first meeting at 10 Downing Street between the Soviet leaders and the British Ministers on April 19, 1956, in *Soviet News*, No. 3375 (April 20, 1956), p. 2; and Article by N. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence," *Foreign Affairs* (Oct., 1959).

¹⁵ Lt. Gen. S. Krasilnikov, "On the Character of Modern War," *Red Star*, Nov. 18, 1960.

¹⁶ V. D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, Research Study, Rand Corp. (1963), pp. 34-38.

dedicated the willingness of the Soviet Union to enter into an agreement for reduction of conventional military forces but had also taken the unilateral step of announcing a Soviet reduction. The dispute apparently resolved itself when Khrushchev rescinded the cuts.¹⁷

A CONFLICT OF VIEWS

The apparent conflict of views has now been resolved. In a speech to the East German Communists on January 16, 1963, Khrushchev put likely casualties in a nuclear war at 700–800 million and cast doubt on the possibility that even a Communist society could be rebuilt on the radioactive rubble.¹⁸ Sokolovskii, while never specifically stating that a nuclear war would destroy the Soviet Union, points out that “if one hydrogen bomb is detonated in an industrial region, up to 1.5 million people may be killed outright and about 400,000 more people will perish from the subsequent fallout.”¹⁹

It is clear that the Soviet Union has not only recognized that nuclear war will result in mutual annihilation but has brought this message home to the Soviet people.

The dean of Soviet scientists, A. V. Topchiev, shortly before his death, in an article written for publication in the United States,

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31. Speech by Comrade N. S. Khrushchev to the VIth Congress of the German United Socialist Party, in *Pravda* (Jan. 17, 1963).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

²⁰ A. V. Topchiev, “Interdependence of Science and Society,” article in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (March, 1963), p. 11.

²¹ The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, continue to predict that a nuclear war would destroy decadent capitalists but that “a civilization thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future” would be rapidly created on the debris of dead imperialism and would repay “the enormous sacrifices of a future imperialist war.” *The Washington Post and Times-Herald*, April 20, 1960. Reuters report of an article in the Chinese Communist party’s official magazine, *Red Flag*.

²² See “Secretary Dulles’ News Conference of August 6, 1957,” Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 37 (Aug. 26, 1957), p. 347.

²³ “Secretary Dulles’ News Conference of Dec. 10, 1957,” *Ibid.*, (Dec. 30, 1957), p. 1024.

²⁴ From the text of an address made by President John F. Kennedy at commencement exercises at the American University, Washington, D. C., June 10, 1963. U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 17 (June, 1963), p. 5.

not only forcefully reiterated this message but sharply criticized the “militaristic elements” for attempting to channel the attainments of science into purely military uses.²⁰ Such criticism would be improbable unless the Soviet position firmly recognized the concept of mutual annihilation by nuclear warfare, and therefore supported a policy of peaceful co-existence.²¹

III

“Acceptance in principle,” said Dulles, “is a long way off from gaining something that is satisfactory. Before you have anything concrete to put your teeth in . . . you have to find out what kind of inspection there is going to be.”²² Concerning the “agreement in principle” on military matters at the Nato Conference, Dulles stated that this was instead “an agreement which is highly specific and subject to a very well specified contingency. The ordinary use of the words ‘agreement in principle’ means that you accept the general idea but you reserve the right to frustrate that idea by a lot of detailed objections.”²³ The practical importance of the change in Soviet ideological emphasis in the direction of peaceful co-existence was that it resulted after a short interval in precise Soviet proposals which permitted genuine negotiation and might be translated into a specific program.

So long as the disarmament negotiations rested completely on future aspirations such as “comprehensive disarmament” or “general and complete disarmament,” it had not been possible to go far beyond the reiteration of propaganda slogans. It was as necessary then as it is today to “focus instead on a more practical peace, based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions—on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interest of all concerned.”²⁴

Shortly after the Soviet admission of mutual annihilation resulting from a nuclear war came the Soviet suggestion, as an alternative to immediate complete disarmament, of a series of partial measures in the context of easing international tension and creating an

atmosphere of mutual peace and confidence as an important step toward ultimately achieving elimination of nuclear weapons. The first Soviet move in this direction came as early as June 1, 1954.²⁵

In 1957, approximately six weeks after the opening of a new series of discussions, the Soviet Union brought forward a complete package of partial and immediately achievable disarmament proposals.²⁶ These Soviet proposals together with the Western counter-proposals furnished the basis for the most detailed discussions of disarmament that had taken place during the post-World War II period. At times, an accord seemed within grasp.

On several occasions—not only during the 1957 negotiations but even prior thereto—when some measure of agreement in principle seemed to have been attained, the Western powers (particularly the United Kingdom) suggested detailed technical discussions.²⁷ The Soviet Union had always resisted such technical discussions, suggesting that they would be appropriate only after a signed agreement in principle. In September of 1957, the promising discussions of the spring and summer had resulted in an impasse which led to the Soviet refusal to participate either in the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee as then constituted, and had brought to an end all disarmament negotiations. In 1958, the Soviet Union, reversing previous positions, agreed to participate in two sets of technical discussions—the first dealing with the cessation of nuclear testing, and the second, on “measures to prevent surprise attack.” The test cessation conferences continued in one form or another until now and have been sufficiently thorough to permit the immediate drafting of a precise and detailed treaty, should there be agreement in principle.

At the technical conference to prevent sur-

prise attack, the Soviet and Western ideas were totally divergent even on the intended subject matter of the conference. After two months the conference adjourned with no agreement but with a considerably better understanding on both sides of the wide differences in viewpoint.

Despite a number of attempts by the West, it has not been possible since 1958 to have detailed technical discussions on any subject other than cessation of nuclear testing. Furthermore, in the test cessation negotiations, even though the Western powers had made many concessions, until July, 1963, the Soviet Union apparently followed the practice of stiffening its demands whenever the West seemed ready to accept the Soviet position. While this estimate may be an oversimplification of both Soviet and Western attitudes, it nevertheless is clear that the test cessation discussions had been marking time in the last two years.

Thus in contrast to the encouraging developments in Soviet doctrines moving more in the direction of peaceful co-existence, on the surface there seemed to have been little progress and perhaps retrogression in the even more important and significant efforts to translate agreement in principle into a detailed workable program.

IV

The easiest explanation for the failure to create a practical framework to end the arms race is that the Soviet Union continues to use disarmament solely as a propaganda platform and has no real interest in ending the arms race. Yet there are other possible explanations which would be consistent with a genuine Soviet interest in disarmament.

As early as 1954 the most experienced and the ablest of Western disarmament negotiators, Jules Moch of France, expressed the view that the Soviet Union required an immediate reduction in armed forces in order to maintain its civilian production.²⁸ This viewpoint may have been premature, since the Soviet Union has still given no indication that it considers the maintenance of relative military strength vis-a-vis the West as in-

²⁵ U. N. Doc. DC/SC.1/8 (June 8, 1954).

²⁶ U. N. Doc. DC/SC.1/PV.109 (April 30, 1957), pp. 2-30.

²⁷ See “The London Calendar” in B. G. Bechhoefer, *Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control* (1961), pp. 345-6.

²⁸ Bechhoefer, *op. cit.*, p. 597.

compatible with the Soviet standard of living. However, there have been recent indications that even the Soviet military are concerned with the excessive expenditures necessary to maintain the arms race.

Sokolovskii makes the timid suggestion that because of the "modern means of mass destruction and the attendant difficulties this poses for the completion of mobilization, it would seem advisable to have peacetime forces set up on such a basis as to achieve the main objectives of the initial period of a war without additional mobilization. . . . To maintain armed forces on such a basis is not within the economic capability of any, even the strongest, state."²⁹

Topchiev, the dean of Soviet scientists, uninhibited by military considerations, sharply criticizes military thinking and argues that it is impossible to have both the arms race and scientific progress for "lightening the extending human life."³⁰

Statements such as these would not be possible if, in fact, the Soviet Union were irrevocably opposed to ending the arms race except on terms that would imply the unilateral disarmament and ultimate surrender of the West. We should consider some other reasonable explanation of the Soviet unwillingness to negotiate precise and workable agreements. We do not have to search far for such possible explanation.

In 1957 when the Soviet Union for the first time produced a package of partial measures of disarmament which permitted serious negotiations, the underlying immediate Soviet objectives seemed to be primarily to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons

and secondarily to lessen the possibility of accidental war.³¹

The following year, when reversing previous positions, the Soviet Union agreed to enter into technical discussions prior to a signed disarmament document, the subjects of the technical discussions were test cessation and prevention of surprise attack.³² Test cessation obviously was directly related to the policy of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is less obvious but nonetheless true that the Soviet concept of measures to prevent surprise attack was likewise directed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet proposal was the so-called Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.³³ Proliferation of nuclear weapons can take place in either of two ways. A state without nuclear weapons can resort to testing and develop its own weapons. Cessation of nuclear testing would close this road. However, a state likewise can obtain nuclear weapons through transfer from another state. A nuclear-free zone in Central Europe would close this road at least insofar as the Germans are concerned. The same formulae applied to Asia would prevent the Chinese Communists from obtaining nuclear weapons.

RUSSIAN FEAR OF GERMANY

The Soviet Union has consistently placed what many of the Western negotiators consider an undue stress on the importance of preventing Germany from obtaining nuclear weapons. Yet such a stress is consistent with the Russian experience in the First and Second World Wars. In view of this Russian attitude any progress towards limiting the arms race might depend on agreements that would give to the Soviet Union an assurance that Germany would not become a nuclear power.

An agreement to cease tests in and of itself does not accomplish that objective. Nor does an agreement to cease tests standing alone and not leading to more extensive agreements do much to limit the arms race or lessen the menace of nuclear warfare. Furthermore, the Secretary of State of the United

²⁹ Sokolovskii, *op. cit.*, p. 433.

³⁰ A. V. Topchiev, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

³¹ Thomas C. Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," in *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security*, Donald G. Brennan, ed., (1961), pp. 167-86.

³² "Premier Khrushchev's Letter to the President," Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 39 (Aug. 18, 1958), p. 280. See also *Ibid.*, Vol. 38 (June 9, 1958), pp. 940-41.

³³ "News Conference Remarks by the Polish Foreign Minister (Rapacki) Regarding an Atom-free Zone in Central Europe (Extracts), Nov. 4, 1958," U. S. Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, Vol. II, Publication 7008 (Aug., 1960), pp. 1217-19.

States recently declared that the United States and the West have far more to gain than the Soviet Union from the cessation of tests.³⁴

In short, it may be that extensive steps towards limiting the arms race may have to take place concurrently with political settlements involving Germany. The June 15 issue of *The Economist* contains the following suggestion on present Soviet attitudes:

His [Khrushchev's] doctrine of co-existence can be summed up crudely as an attempt to find a "modus vivendi" with Washington. The conversations which members of *The Economist* had with competent Russians in Moscow last month confirmed that this is still the ruling doctrine and will remain so as long as the United States keeps the effective monopoly of western nuclear power, or rather as long as it does not share it to any major extent with west Germany. The only question (but a vital one for Mr. Kennedy) is the stage at which Moscow will consider that the German finger is effectively on the nuclear trigger.³⁵

If this is a correct diagnosis, it would explain the Soviet failure to move forward to a specific program to limit the arms race, until such a program contains not only test cessation but other measures which would assure that Germany—and through the application of the same formula, Communist China—will not obtain nuclear weapons. It would unquestionably add to the attractiveness of any program to the Soviet Union if the program permitted the devotion of a greater proportion of Soviet resources to peaceful objectives.

Since such a broader program would of necessity be intimately linked with the settlement of other political problems, such as Berlin, it was logical for Khrushchev to state, as he did in June, 1963, that a test cessation agreement which required on-site inspections

behind the Iron Curtain could not be achieved by the disarmament negotiators but would require a decision at the summit.³⁶

The Khrushchev suggestion made on July 2, 1963, in a speech to 6,000 East Berliners, for an uninspected ban on all except underground tests together with a "non-aggression pact" seemed in the same pattern.³⁷ Indeed at the American Embassy Independence Day reception in Moscow, Mikoyan, when asked if the "non-aggression pact" was the price of the nuclear test ban, replied: "Yes, there must be a connection."³⁸

Within two weeks after Mikoyan's statement Khrushchev had initialed a *limited* test cessation pact involving no penetration of the Iron Curtain without any accompanying political agreements. The Soviet leaders, however, immediately thereafter revived a series of proposals both political and directly related to arms limitations. Thus it seems probable that the next step in the direction of limiting the arms race may be a package proposal containing some political agreements. President Kennedy's speech at the American University, which *Pravda* significantly published in full, was ideally calculated to produce this type of detente.

Bernhard G. Bechhoefer is an attorney practicing in Washington, D. C. He is a graduate of Harvard College, Harvard Law School and the National War College of the Armed Forces. He served for 16 years in the State Department as a Foreign Affairs Officer and later as a Foreign Service Officer. From 1946 until 1958, he devoted a large portion of his time to problems of disarmament and peaceful uses of the atom and served as a senior advisor to practically all of the United States representatives dealing with disarmament during that period. He is the author of a history of the disarmament negotiations from 1946 through 1960 entitled "Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control" (Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1961). He is also the author of a number of articles in various periodicals dealing with disarmament and peaceful uses of the atom.

³⁴ Statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 11, 1963. "U. S. Efforts to Achieve a Safeguarded Test Ban Treaty." United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Publication 15 (May, 1963), pp. 4-5.

³⁵ "Steady, the Coexisters," in *The Economist* (June 15, 1963), p. 1119.

³⁶ *The Washington Post, Times-Herald* (June 11, 1963).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, (July 3, 1963).

³⁸ *Ibid.*, (July 5, 1963).

Discussing the relationship of space technology to military goals, this Soviet military expert predicts that "space warfare capabilities will assume an ever increasing role in strategic calculations during this decade. It would appear that the conquest of space has become a primary route that the U.S.S.R. will follow in an effort to reinvigorate both the image and reality of its power in the cold war."

The Soviet Space Program

By ROBERT A. KILMARX
United States Department of Defense

THE SOVIET space program is entering a period of more accelerated advance as a result of careful planning, high priority investment of resources and a step-by-step approach to problem-solving. There is good reason to believe that this new period will include the development of operational space systems within the next few years to augment the military as well as the political strength of the U.S.S.R. Evidence of this intent can be found in the recent record of Soviet astronautical activity, in statements by Soviet political and military leaders concerning program objectives, in organizational changes, in revisions in Soviet positions in the field of space jurisprudence and even in reorientations in Soviet space technology. The flames of the cold war may be dampened on earth but the spark has already risen in space and may soon ignite this new dimension.

The importance the Russians attach to their space program is attested to by the fact that it has received increased allocations of scarce resources at a time when the Soviet economy has been facing severe economic problems: the rate of industrial growth is down, the pace of new investment has faltered, agriculture is in the doldrums and the consumer's needs are still not being met.

It is also a time when pressures from the

military sector have been more intense to build up strategic, nuclear forces while retaining modern mass armies and conventional weapons systems. Despite Premier Khrushchev's ambitious plans to equal and surpass the West in economic strength, the annual rate of the increase in the Soviet gross national product (GNP) has probably fallen below that of the United States, at least for a while, largely because of military and space requirements.

The increased pace of the Soviet space program in 1962 and 1963 can be statistically or qualitatively demonstrated in many ways. For example, of the 35-plus space launchings from 1957 through 1962 which were at least partially successful, 20 occurred in 1962 and the rate remains high in 1963. In 1962 and early 1963, the Soviets stepped up the pace of their failure-plagued interplanetary program with a number of attempts to probe Mars and Venus, resumed their lunar launchings, began an active new *Cosmos* series of earth satellite launchings, and took a giant step in their primary area of concentration, manned space flight near the earth.

On August 11-12, 1962, there were the twin orbital flights of Andriyan Nikolayev and Pavel Popovich, who approached within 6.5 km of each other in space. In June, 1963, similar dual flights followed of 48 and

31 orbits, respectively, by Valentina Tereshkova and Lieutenant Colonel Valery Bykovsky.

All these flights demonstrated advanced capabilities and prospects for successful orbital systems which seemed highly uncertain only a few years ago. Space rendezvous, docking and inter-satellite transfer may soon follow, as well as some soft landings on the moon.

MILITARY USES OF SPACE

Prior to 1962, the Soviets repeatedly claimed that their space program was directed only towards peaceful, scientific purposes. Later this hackneyed theme began to change. Following Premier Khrushchev's implication in December, 1961, that the "space ships" of Gagarin and Titov could be used to carry nuclear weapons "to any point on the globe," a number of Soviet military leaders and strategists developed this new theme. The list includes Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovsky, who characterized space as one of the areas of future warfare in Soviet military doctrine. This followed articles in *Red Star* in March, 1962, which stated that "The Soviet Union is forced to accept the necessity of studying military operations utilizing outer-space means."¹

A few months later, statements appeared in Marshal Sokolovsky's book, *Military Strategy*, to the effect that the use of outer space and of space vehicles to strengthen Soviet defenses "is considered essential in Soviet military strategy." According to this text, "an important problem now is warfare with artificial earth satellites which can be launched for the most diverse reasons, even as carriers of nuclear weapons."

SATELLITES AND ROCKETS

On February 21, 1963, the developing crescendo of suggestions concerning a Soviet military space program went into a higher gear when the former Commander-in-Chief

of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Marshal Biryuzov, claimed over Moscow Radio that rockets can be launched from satellites "at any desirable time and at any point of the satellites' trajectory, on command from earth." Marshal Biryuzov was formerly Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces; he was placed at the head of the General Staff after the failure to establish an offensive missile base in Cuba led to a reassertion by Premier Khrushchev of his radical military doctrine of January, 1960, with its primary emphasis on advanced means of waging war, particularly on strategic rocket nuclear weapons.

A POSSIBILITY

In view of these pronouncements, the possibility certainly exists that the Soviets have already decided to develop a number of military space systems. Thus it is prudent to recall the history of other weapons programs, as did *The Economist* over two years ago. "The Russians . . .," stated *The Economist*, "persistently maintained that their nuclear research programme was devoted to peaceful purposes right up to the moment when it produced weapons." According to a United States authority on the Soviet space program, F. J. Krieger, the current *Cosmos* series of Soviet heavy satellites is to be a program of directly military-oriented space development.

HYPERSONIC FLIGHT?

Looking to the future, one may visualize the possible development of a Soviet hypersonic-glide, sub-orbital weapons system or an orbital, maneuverable space plane. Recently Soviet aircraft designer Mikoyan predicted hypersonic flight with variable-wing aircraft, traveling six or seven times the speed of sound. He said that such aircraft might have ranges of several thousand miles and might be capable of making several circuits of the earth. Judging from the configuration of re-entry systems for Soviet space boosters appearing on Soviet monuments and postage stamps, greater emphasis will be given by the Soviets in the years ahead to aerody-

¹ Propaganda aspects of such pronouncements, however, obscure any assessment of the feasibility of the concepts discussed by the Soviets.

namic vehicles that fly at hypersonic speeds, i.e., vehicles that literally ride the head of a ballistic missile.

Since the establishment of space stations may be considered one of the most important intermediate goals of Soviet astronautics, the not-too-distant future offers the prospect of giant, Soviet space stations in near-earth and then in more distant orbits; these space stations will be capable of performing a wide variety of missions. At a later date the Soviets may seek to extend such capabilities to moon-bases and even to interplanetary space.

The offensive and defensive weapons available to such vehicles may be nuclear or perhaps of the radiation type, capable of destroying select targets instantaneously and from great distances. The demonstrable conformity between the early dreams of science fiction and the probable realities of astronautics offers a major challenge to those who postulate stability in strategic forces in the decades to come.

COST EFFECTIVENESS

To the Soviets, calculations of cost effectiveness for space systems seem to be broadly construed, to include political values and not just comparative tests of true military worth. The Soviets are primarily interested in providing a "back-drop" of military power to support a forward political policy and in improving the world's image concerning the alleged benefits of the Communist formula for progressive development.

The Soviet Union has already learned that missile and space spectacles can impress the uncommitted as well as the free world, can enhance the image of deterrent strength and can substitute temporarily for real fighting capability. The utility of scientific space spectacles as hallmarks of power, however, has depreciated with time. As *The Economist* noted in April, 1961, "... the successive marvels of the space age are already tending to yield diminishing moral returns." To reinvigorate the political value of space achievements, the Soviets may now establish a closer, perhaps demonstrable, relationship

between space experiments and real strategic military strength.

SPACE PROGRAM CHANGES

Another clue that a major change has occurred in scope, pace and direction of the Soviet space program is revealed by an examination of organizational realignment in the U.S.S.R.

Initially, when scientific orientation was the paramount requirement, the program was managed primarily by a scientific committee under the Astronomical Council of the Academy of Science. This committee, called the Interagency Committee for Interplanetary Communication, included representatives of the military establishment; the initial steps towards the conquest of space were viewed as a joint military-civilian effort. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense and several State Committees concerned with defense production provided the facilities, the launching vehicles and other supports used to carry scientific instruments and pioneer astronauts into the cosmos.

The program in this early phase was governed in large measure by actual and anticipated requirements of national power, i.e., by prospects for obtaining short-term political benefits as a result of space spectacles and probably for developing future military space systems. The likelihood that military systems objectives were a governing priority for the Soviet space program from its earliest days is indicated by Soviet concentration on manned satellite operations in a limited envelope of near-earth space.

By 1962, important organizational changes are believed to have been made in the Soviet space program. The requirements of systems development and production were probably broadening the scope of scientific and industrial activity. Furthermore, the need was becoming greater for more concentrated basic research on the operational environment in which Soviet space systems would function. As a result, the Soviet space program today probably has at its apex a committee of the Council of Ministers, with the military program controlled by Minister of

Defense Malinovsky. His requirements for production resources are under the over-all purview of Dimitry Ustinov, head of the newly formed Supreme Council of the National Economy.

Research needs are coordinated through the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research, established in April, 1961, and now headed by K. N. Rudnev. Both officials are experienced leaders in the field of defense technology. Basic research is conducted under the Academy of Science, which probably also controls the "peaceful uses" of space programs. This aspect of the Soviet space program includes cooperation with the West in such fields as meteorological and communications satellites.

The gradual evolution of a separate organizational and institutional relationship for the military and non-military aspects of the Soviet space program is in keeping with the historical pattern noted in the Soviet nuclear program. In time, we may expect to see the emergence of a Main Administration on the Uses of Space to handle the non-military aspects of the Soviet space program, although developments in this area could also contribute to the support of Soviet military capabilities. The organization of the military space program will probably remain obscured by concealed directorships, complex institutional relationships and even misleading organizational names. This path was followed in the Soviet nuclear weapons program, which cloaked its extensive weapons development and production operations under the innocent label of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building.

TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE

Extensive investment of resources over a long period of time has already provided the Soviet Union with a technological base. The technological base is sufficiently broad to permit the development of military space capabilities without long lead times after basic policy decisions have been made and without protracted research and development. This aspect of space may also be compared with a "peaceful" nuclear pro-

gram which can be translated into at least limited, war-making capabilities without much delay. The unique and disturbing features of broadly-based, modern technology add to the risks of technological surprise and weapons proliferation and complicate problems of disarmament.

United States awareness of this vulnerability in regard to space weapons has been called to the attention of Congress.

It is worth noting that the Air Force Research and Development Chief reportedly told the House Space Committee that it is conceivable that some object put into orbit around the earth by the Soviet Union might carry a nuclear warhead without the United States knowing it.

Concurrently the United States is seeking to explore all prospects for military roles in this dimension. In the words of Eugene Fubini, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Deputy Director, Defense Research and Engineering),

We are proceeding with the *Dyna-Soar* and *Gemini* programs as insurance against what lies behind the curtain that veils requirements for manned military space efforts; the curtain we shall try to lift.

The United States already has many projects under way to meet recognized military requirements in space with unmanned vehicles.

The technology of the Soviet space program has been entering a period of change. Established practice has revealed emphasis on proven design and a certain conservatism in production processes, where possible, to reduce risks and avoid costly efforts to find sophisticated, new solutions to old problems. Soviet space vehicles, for example, have combined advanced designs and engineering techniques with off-the-shelf items and standard practices; Soviet design has utilized proven components and sub-systems and the gradual accumulation of test experience.

However, new demands are being made because of the greater sophistication required of new components, the increases needed in performance parameters and the rise in the complexity of experimental goals. The

Soviet space program must now give more attention to original, perfectionist and novel designs, to new materials and engineering methods and to higher quality production techniques. State-of-the-art advances have become more important. Soviet space scientists and engineers must depart even more from the past focus on ease-of-production, reliability, simplicity and short developmental lead-times. They probably can benefit even less from Western advances than in the past.

SCIENTIFIC ADVANCE

This transformation is made possible by the gradual reduction or removal of the constraints of past industrial backwardness; of shortages of skilled personnel, quality materials and equipment; and of institutional and managerial blockages. There are many indices of this change in capabilities and prospects. The Soviet investment in basic research has grown at a very high rate; the number of research and test centers and facilities is mounting; the available pool of scientists and engineers with advanced degrees who are seeking to make their mark in research is reaching new levels in numbers and in qualifications.

Supporting industries are also gaining in experience and thus are lightening the burden on the research and development sector. Furthermore, the outlook for better planning, organization and managerial methods through cybernetics will promote more effective use of and control over scientific and production resources, in spite of Premier Khrushchev's recent complaints about the efficiency of the armament industry and his new efforts to improve economic management. In short, from the technological standpoint, the Soviet space program is entering a period of innovation and quality advance on expanding economic foundations. Long term risk-taking has always been attractive to the Soviet Union when the costs were low and opportunities great; now more consideration must be given to shorter-term risks and to their reduction through scientific investigation and experimentation.

SPACE JURISPRUDENCE

Other indications of a new phase in the Soviet space program have been provided by developments concerning Soviet jurisprudence in space. According to Robert Crane, who has ably analyzed developments in this field in the *American Journal of International Law*, "during 1962 the first indications appeared that Soviet space law was developing into an instrument to support the shift of [the Soviet space] offensive from the political into the military realm." One of the most significant indications reported is "the refinement and even the rejection of the previous Soviet position that military uses of space are illegal. . . ."

As recently stated by Soviet legal space experts in the spring of 1962, there is no "organic contradiction" between the use of space for scientific purposes and its use to protect national security. In August, 1962, the Executive Secretary of the Space Law Commission of the Soviet Academy of Sciences stated: ". . . it by no means follows that it is forbidden to use this space for striking through it or with its aid a retaliatory blow at the aggressor in the course of legitimate self-defense."

A CAUTIOUS EVALUATION

The significance of this trend can be evaluated only with caution at this point in history because of the uncertainties of politics, the pressures of economics, the many remaining mysteries of space, and the wide

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A survey of developments in Soviet government since 1953 "raises more questions than it answers."

Change and Stability in the Soviet Union

By MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

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MARCH 5, 1963, marked the beginning of the second decade since the death of Stalin. The ten years that followed the disappearance of the dictator were replete with dramatic changes which at times seemed to raise hopes for a drastic revision of the objectives and methods of the Soviet government. How much were these expectations justified? The present article endeavors to throw some light on this unfortunately all too important question.

I

The succession of leadership in the Soviet Union presents elements of mystery which no one has yet been able to solve satisfactorily, although surmises, conjectures and guesses are many. While Stalin's death was hardly unexpected—he was 74 and was known to be in failing health—it assumed the character of a major event and threw the leaders of the party into a state of confusion. Nevertheless, it seemed at first as if the transfer of power to a new leader was to take place in an orderly fashion and according to plan. Georgy Malenkov, long regarded as heir-apparent, was appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers and senior party secretary, the two principal offices held by Stalin. Others in control of the government were Lavrenty Beria, head of the security police and minister of the interior; Vyacheslav Molotov, foreign minister; Nicholas Bulganin, a

marshal and defense minister; and Lazar Kaganovich, then first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. These men were simultaneously members of the presidium of the party central committee. In 1952, this committee had superseded the Politburo; after the re-organization of March, 1953, it consisted of ten members, among them Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Voroshilov.

The arrangements, which seemed logical enough, proceeded to disintegrate at once. Ten days after Stalin's death Malenkov was relieved of the duties of party secretary and was succeeded in that office by Khrushchev; in September Khrushchev was made first secretary. Other and more startling developments followed in rapid succession. As head of the security police, Beria appeared all powerful. Nonetheless he was arrested in July; in December, 1953, it was announced that he had been tried and shot after he had confessed to a variety of crimes, including that of being an agent of the British intelligence for decades. In February, 1955, Malenkov requested the Supreme Soviet to relieve him of the position of chairman of the Council of Ministers, on the ground of incompetence; he was transferred to a minor ministerial post and was succeeded by Bulganin. But it soon became clear that true authority rested with Khrushchev, secretary of the party, and not with the titular head of the government.

This situation was in agreement with Soviet tradition: prior to May, 1941, Stalin, who was rightly regarded as Russia's dictator, held no government office. In June, 1957, the central committee denounced the "anti-party group" consisting of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov (formerly editor of *Pravda* and foreign minister from 1956 to 1957). Members of the group were accused of opposing the foreign and domestic policies of the party (reconciliation with Yugoslavia, reorganization of industry and agriculture) and of agitation in favor of changes in party organs (presumably removal of Khrushchev). They were expelled from the central committee and the presidium, and were appointed to minor non-political positions. In March, 1958, Bulganin was dismissed and was succeeded as chairman of the Council of Ministers by Khrushchev.

Thus the two highest offices in the Soviet Union, those of the first party secretary and head of the government, became reunited as they were from 1941 to 1953. In December, 1958, Bulganin, Khrushchev's erstwhile traveling companion, was denounced as a member of the "anti-party group" and his career was ended. Two outstanding military leaders, Marshals Zhukov and Voroshilov, suffered a somewhat similar fate. By the end of 1958, the principal political personalities of 1953, with the exception of the seemingly indestructible Mikoyan, were gone. These dramatic changes were carried out to the accompaniment of incessant talk about "collective leadership." It is noteworthy that, according to Khrushchev, the presidium of the central committee supported the "anti-party group" while the committee itself opposed it. This is a surprising statement and it is difficult to see how such a situation could have arisen. It seems clear, however, that after 1956 and probably earlier Khrushchev, who in March, 1953, did not rate among the top political figures, wielded an authority as comprehensive as that of Stalin.

The vagaries of leadership in 1953-1958 do not encourage speculations as to Khrushchev's likely successor. Moreover, so little is known about Soviet political leaders, except for a

very few, that even if one could surmise correctly as to who will take Khrushchev's place, such knowledge would be of small practical usefulness.

II

It is probably correct to describe Stalin, after 1936, as a conservative revolutionary, meaning by conservative a person who dislikes change. He remained in the seclusion of the Kremlin, was seldom seen in public, made few speeches and shunned new policies. In spite of the upheaval of the war, the Soviet Union in 1953, administratively and economically, was not very different from what it was in the middle 1930's. Khrushchev, unlike his predecessor, is irrepressible and ebullient, and has a seemingly inexhaustible capacity for talking and a passion for travel. He is not afraid of change and has initiated a number of reforms of which some were clearly overdue while others are highly experimental.

A law of May 10, 1957, abolished more than 30 federal ministries in charge of economic activities and replaced them by the councils of the 105 newly-created economic administrative regions. The purpose of this reorganization was not autonomy or decentralization of controls but the bringing of the supervising agencies into closer relationship with the producing enterprises. According to Khrushchev, the reform rested on "the Leninist principle of democratic centralism and planned management," whatever this might mean. Simultaneously, the planning agencies were remodelled to meet the new situation, and their powers were extended. Subsequent developments suggest that the economic administrative councils did not live up to expectation. Their structure was altered several times, particularly in 1961 and again in February, 1963. A common criticism is that the councils' approach is parochial and that they tend to sacrifice to local interests those of the nation.

Agricultural reforms comprised three main elements: consolidation of the collective farms (*kolkhozy*) into larger units, abolition of the machine tractor stations (MTS), and de-

velopment of the virgin lands. The consolidation of the *kolkhozy*, a policy which originated with Khrushchev when Stalin was still alive, resulted in the reduction of their number from 252,000 in 1949, to 93,000 in 1953, and to 55,000 in 1959. It was claimed that the decline in the number of farms and the resulting increase in their size would lead to higher productivity and facilitate political control. The farm price policy was revised, and compulsory deliveries and the multiple price system were abolished in 1958. While the revised prices are substantially higher than those paid before, they are said to be still too low to ensure the farmers a reasonable margin of profit. There is so far no marked improvement in the productivity of the collective farms.

The machine tractor stations which since the early 1930's were the chief government controlling and planning agencies in the countryside were abolished by a law of March, 1958, and were reorganized as repair and technical service stations. Large agricultural machinery formerly owned exclusively by the MTS was purchased, with the assistance of the government, by the collective farms. The principal object of the reform was to increase efficiency by eliminating the dual control of agricultural enterprises—by the MTS and the collective farm management.

The vast program for the development of the virgin lands, which are situated in Siberia, Kazakhstan, and the Volga region, was inaugurated by Khrushchev in 1953. By 1961, some 42 million hectares were brought under cultivation. The produce of these newly-developed areas is an important element in the food supply of the nation, but climatic and soil conditions in the east are capricious and unfavorable to agriculture and have led to sharp fluctuations in the size of the harvest. The state farms (*soukhozy*) which are government owned and managed are the prevalent form of farm enterprise in these regions. The recent trend would seem to be away from the collective farms which in the 1930's were regarded as standard, and their reorganization along the lines of the state farms. The number of *soukhozy* rose from 4,900 in

1951 to 6,500 in 1959 when they accounted for two-thirds of the state grain procurement. If this trend continues, a change amounting to a new agrarian revolution would seem to be in the making.

Planning methods, too, were reformed. The five year plans—a characteristic feature of the Soviet economy—were abandoned at the end of 1958 when the sixth five year plan, which had been in effect since 1956, was superseded by the seven year plan covering the period 1959 to 1965. The change was officially justified by a reference to “the radical revision of the system of planning” and presumably reflects the recent trend towards long-range planning. In March, 1963, there was organized a new agency, the Council of National Economy attached to the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., as “the supreme state organ for guiding industry and construction.” The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) was subordinated to the Council which is headed by D. F. Ustinov, a first vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Soviet indices of the rates of growth and figures of actual production are impressive but they do not tell the whole story; errors of planning are onerous and many and costs remain exceedingly high. The recurrent drastic revisions of the administrative controls of both industry and agriculture and of the structure of the planned agencies indicate that the answer to the riddle of business management in a socialist economy is still awaiting a solution.

III

A real effort has been made since 1953 to improve the cultural and material standards of the people. Tuition fees in the upper grades of the secondary schools and in all higher schools, imposed in 1940, were abolished by a law of June, 1956. Compulsory universal education was extended, at least in theory, to eight years. A law of December 24, 1958, “For Strengthening Ties Between School and Life,” provided that admission to the higher schools should be based exclusively on merit attested by such public organizations as the Young Communist League

and trade unions, and that the candidates must have at least two years of practical work in industry or on the farms. This law, if enforced, should prevent the formation of an upper class. Great emphasis was put on correspondence and evening classes in the technical and higher schools and the number of students in these divisions was increased considerably. This is a commendable effort, although the preeminence of education obtained by correspondence or in evening courses is likely to affect unfavorably scholastic standards. Legislation bearing on old-age and disability pensions and on health insurance was revised by a law of July, 1956. Coverage was extended and the rates of pensions and benefits were raised but they still remain exceedingly low.

Industrial labor benefited by post-Stalin legislation. Attachment of workers to jobs, which was introduced in 1940, was terminated by a law of September, 1956. The minimum rates of wages in industry, construction, transportation, and communications were raised by a law of September, 1956, and further increases were made effective in later years. Beginning in 1956, the seven-hour day was gradually substituted for the eight-hour day (which had been in effect since 1940) and was generally applied by the end of 1960. Transition to the 40-hour week was promised by the end of 1962 and to the 30-35-hour week beginning in 1964.

The outlook for industrial labor may seem promising even though the existing conditions are far from satisfactory. Consumer goods are in short supply and often of inferior quality and the housing situation is appalling, but the 1961 party program speaks of "a living standard in the Soviet Union higher than that of any capitalist country." If one trusts party promises, the future should look bright.

IV

Since the inception of Soviet rule the Communist party has been the mainstay of the regime. Its participation in public affairs, however, has become more conspicuous in the last ten years. Party congresses are held

more frequently. The eighteenth congress met in 1939 and the nineteenth in 1952. The twentieth congress was held in 1956; the twenty-first in 1959, and the twenty-second in 1961. Since the functions of the congresses are limited, as in the past, to applauding the leaders, particularly the first secretary, and offer no opportunity for real debate, the frequency of the meetings is of minor importance. The membership of the party increased from 6.9 million in 1952 to 9.7 million in 1961. This expansion might prove of real significance for it tends to transform the party from an élite into a mass organization. The twenty-second congress approved the party statutes and program; the latter replaced the program of 1919 which theoretically was still in force. Commissions for the revision of the program were appointed by the eighteenth congress in 1939 and by the nineteenth congress in 1952 but they made no progress. The 1961 program is a long and complicated document. It retains much of the traditional phraseology and proclaims the establishment of world communism as its immutable objective, but adopts the view that in some capitalist countries transition to communism may be accomplished without civil war. This is the theoretical basis of coexistence.

Another major novel departure was the policy of de-Stalinization proclaimed by

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Michael T. Florinsky retired from Columbia University in June, 1963. He is the author of many books, including *Towards an Understanding of the U.S.S.R.* (1951); a two-volume study of *Russia: A History and an Interpretation* (1953); and *Integrated Europe?* (1955). Former editor of *Commercial and Tariff History*, 1939-1941, he is a member of the American Economic Association and the Economic History Association. From 1921 to 1932, Mr. Florinsky served as associate editor of the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, a publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a contributing editor of *Current History*.

In a survey of Communist bloc developments in East-Central Europe, this writer observes that "The arms build-up throughout Eastern Europe would seem to indicate a shift in emphasis toward the purely military aspects of power. . . ."

How Strong Is the Soviet Bloc?

By RICHARD F. STAAR

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COMMUNIST REGIMES in Eastern Europe were established as puppets of the Soviet Union toward the end of World War II and continue to be dependent upon the U.S.S.R. for their very existence. The avowed foreign policies of these regimes consist of political collaboration with Russia and with one another as well as weakening the influence of the United States in this vital area of the world. For good historical reasons the peoples, as contrasted with the rulers, in these countries are suspicious of Soviet "friendship" and remain traditionally attached to the West.

The geographic area under scrutiny excludes both Albania and Yugoslavia¹ which, due to peculiar circumstances, are not currently members of the Soviet Bloc, having been expelled or never invited to join the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance and the Warsaw Pact military alliance.

Ten years after his death, the dictator of one of the greatest expanding empires in the world today would never recognize his East European satrapies. Stalin had ruled the Soviet bloc with an iron hand through local agents, most of whom had spent many years training for political warfare in Moscow.

Many of these men are still in high places, despite the de-Stalinization which has rehabilitated many "loyal" Communists (but only Communists) who had gone to their deaths because of this psychotic tyrant. The main difference now is that Khrushchev has delegated a certain degree of responsibility to his viceroys in Eastern Europe. This area of competence is restricted, however, to intra-orbit relations.

In brief, the monolith has disappeared. Differences are being reported optimistically in the West. Thus, the "Hungarians are now rivaling the Poles in the degree of personal freedom granted the average man." However, "the still Stalinist-minded Czech regime is doing its best to keep a tight reign on its people." Farther away, "the Rumanians at long last are beginning to show signs of assuming a degree of independence of Moscow. . . ."² Obviously, the purpose behind such reports is to project an image in the West of satellite leaders in Eastern Europe striving to liberalize their countries. How much importance should be placed on this interpretation and what, if any, has been the influence of the Soviet Union?

The eighth congress of the Bulgarian Communist party indicated the restrictive nature characterizing de-Stalinization. The purge of Anton Yugov and his associates, on whom responsibility was placed for the "personality cult,"³ appeared to be the result of conflict between two factions. Furthermore, all of

¹ See the two sections on these countries in *Current History*, XLIV, No. 261 (May, 1963), pp. 294-304, 309-310; the entire issue being devoted to Eastern Europe.

² *The New York Times* (May 19, 1963).

³ "Widerspruchvolle Entstalinisierung in Bulgarien," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (November 24, 1962).

those removed had been connected in the past with the secret police. As in the U.S.S.R., the system itself was never to blame for Stalinist crimes. All Party institutions have been and will remain pure.

Todor Zhivkov replaced Yugov as premier and thus became both Party and government head, assuming a dual role similar to that played by Nikita Khrushchev in the U.S.S.R. and Janos Kadar in Hungary. It is doubtful whether Soviet leadership had anything to do with the belated rehabilitation of Traicho Kostov,⁴ executed in 1949, or indeed with the Yugov purge. Since all satellite chieftains are loyal to Khrushchev, why should Moscow want to remove any of them?

Even prior to the Czech Communist congress, the removal of Stalin's body from the mausoleum was emulated with the transfer of Klement Gottwald's coffin from its special resting place. In contrast to the Bulgarians, only minor personnel changes took place at the December, 1962, congress. Party leader Antonin Novotny's position is difficult, but he continues to dominate because he has no strong rival. This twelfth congress did resolve, however, to have all remaining political trials of the Stalinist period investigated within four months.

⁴ *Rabotnichesko Delo* [Workers' Deed], Sofia (December 27, 1962).

⁵ *Radio Prague* (April 10, 1963).

⁶ *Rude Pravo* [Red Justice], Prague (December 18, 1952).

⁷ Indicated by *Kulturny Zivot* [Cultural Life], Bratislava, No. 18 (May 4, 1963); confirmed by *Rude Pravo* (June 27, 1963) which also lists five others rehabilitated who had not been executed.

⁸ Two less important persons, V. Slavic and J. Urvalek (chief prosecutor at the Slansky trial) also have been removed. All confirmed by *Rude Pravo* (May 14, 1963) after nearly six weeks of rumors. Bacilek and Koehler received positions on parliamentary committees for the budget and industry, respectively. *The New York Times* (July 11, 1963).

⁹ *Neues Deutschland*, East Berlin (January 15, 1963).

¹⁰ As cited by O. Frei, "Desintegration in Sowjetzonenstaat," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (May 16, 1963).

It is of interest to note that a second wall has been constructed in East Germany by a decree proclaiming that no citizen may contact any foreign representative without foreign ministry permission. *Gesetzblatt*, East Berlin (May 18, 1963). Only the United Arab Republic, Austria, and Finland maintain trade or consular missions there; hence, the decree is aimed at other Communist states.

The matter was taken up by a plenum of the Central Committee.⁵ It appeared obvious that Rudolf Slansky, the former secretary-general who had been hanged with seven others in 1952 for "high treason, espionage, sabotage, and betrayal of military secrets" might not be rehabilitated, because Novotny himself "above all others was responsible for the evidence produced"⁶ at the trial. Only ex-Foreign Minister Vladimir Clementis thus far has received posthumous rehabilitation, according to the newspaper of the Slovak Writers' Union.⁷ However, on August 8, 1963, *Rude Pravo* reported that the Supreme Court "juridically" had rehabilitated Slansky.

The arrest of the former interior minister, Rudolf Barak, in 1962 and the subsequent removal of such Stalinists as the first secretary of the Slovak party, Karol Bacilek (state security minister, 1952-1953), and Secretariat member Bruno Koehler (Party cadres chief)⁸ at the April, 1963, plenum again shifted responsibility for the executions away from the Party, as has been the case elsewhere. It seems improbable that Moscow would have initiated this internal struggle between factions.

Whereas in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia certain Stalinists have been purged but others remain in top positions, the East German leadership is unique in that Walter Ulbricht has served as Moscow's viceroy since the end of the war. Loyal to his masters, he repeated the Soviet line on West Berlin at the sixth Socialist Unity (Communist) party congress. According to him, this problem

... seems to have become a prestige question for the Western Powers. . . . The consequence of this is that a West Berlin solution . . . must be brought about in several stages. . . . The U.N. should take over certain international obligations and functions there.⁹

The periodical *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, which reflects the views of the East German foreign ministry, more recently stated that the Four Powers will continue to exercise responsibility for the divided city until a peace treaty has been signed. This magazine even spoke of Berlin as a "special area" under quadripartite administration.¹⁰ Complete silence

regarding a separate peace treaty is also noteworthy, since it may indicate new Soviet tactics.

The situation in Hungary has become even more flexible. The "personality cult" issue was settled three months prior to the eighth congress of the Socialist Workers' (Communist) party in November, 1962. During the previous year, First Secretary and Premier Janos Kadar had coined the slogan, "Who is not against us, is with us." But he explained to the congress that this was a statement only for purposes of agitation and had nothing to do with ideology.

Apparently with the permission of the U.S.S.R., the Budapest regime has scored impressive results in its attempt to normalize relations with the United States. The basis for such a move was laid by the amnesty¹¹ for certain political prisoners, civilian and military, from the 1956 "counter-revolution." Our Department of State indicated to the United States Congress that it would no longer block approval of the Hungarian delegation's credentials at the United Nations, which had denied the delegation neither its seat nor vote. With the recent visit to Budapest by U Thant, it is probable that the United Nations will remove the issue of the bloody 1956 suppression from its agenda.

Hungary also plays an important part in world affairs for Moscow in dealing with the Vatican. Pope John XXIII had started negotiations for Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty's transfer from his asylum in the United States Legation in Hungary. Pope Paul VI apparently has continued the talks through

Bishop Endre Hamvas, acting head of the Hungarian Catholic Bench of Bishops, and Franziskus Cardinal Koenig of Austria.¹² Deputy Premier Gyula Kallai told foreign newsmen in Budapest that the regime would approve the Pope's appointments to the six out of 11 sees which have remained vacant nearly a decade.

The government of Communist Poland also seems to be playing an important role in the maneuvers, directed from Moscow, toward the achievement of a *modus vivendi* with the Vatican. The release of Archbishop Josyf Slipyi, formerly of Lwow in pre-1939 southeastern Poland, after 18 years of confinement in Siberia; the unprecedented private audience granted Khrushchev's son-in-law and *Izvestia* editor, Aleksei I. Adzhubei, by Pope John; and the contacts being continued by Pope Paul regarding Cardinal Mindszenty have been supplemented with the suggestion¹³ that diplomatic relations be established between the Vatican and the regime in Warsaw.

In addition, the Polish Communists again have dusted off the old 1957 Rapacki Plan for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe which would encompass both Germanies, Czechoslovakia and Poland. This idea was resurrected in an article¹⁴ by Warsaw's acting Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski, who proposed implementation of the plan as a solution in part to existing East-West tensions. The same concept was put forth by Ostap Dluski, director of the governmental Foreign Affairs Institute, and Jan Izydorczyk, the former Polish Communist ambassador to East Germany, at an international conference in Brussels.

There seems to be one exception to satellite followers of the Soviet Union in the world arena. Rumania is the only Bloc country to have normalized relations with Albania, its ambassador returning to Tirana in April, 1963, after a commercial treaty had been signed. (The U.S.S.R. suspended both types of relations in 1961). Excerpts from a controversial Chinese letter appeared in the official Rumanian Communist newspaper *Scinteia*,

¹¹ *Radio Budapest* (March 22, 1963).

¹² *The New York Times* (July 5, 1963). The Pope also received U Thant in private audience, after the latter's trip to Budapest, and reportedly discussed the Mindszenty case with him. *Ibid.* (July 12, 1963).

¹³ Speech in parliament by Catholic deputy Jerzy Zawieyski, who had a private audience with Pope John. *Tygodnik Powszechny* [Universal World], Krakow (May 20, 1963). With others, the Pope reportedly even discussed the establishment of a consulate at Kiev, U.S.S.R. *The New York Times* (June 23, 1963).

¹⁴ *Pravda*, Moscow (May 16, 1963). Similar proposals have been made by Moscow or "friends" recently for the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, the Mediterranean, and Scandinavia.

after Moscow had announced that this Peking communication would not be released.

In the section devoted to Bloc relations, the Chinese Communists had made the following veiled attack against their Russian comrades:¹⁵

Under the pretext of "combating the cult of the individual," certain persons are crudely interfering in the internal affairs of other fraternal Parties to change their leadership. What is this if not Great Power chauvinism. . . ?

If any Socialist country unilaterally demands that other fraternal countries submit to its needs, and uses the pretext of opposing what it calls "nationalism" to prevent them [from] relying on their own efforts and from developing their economies independently, then these are pure manifestations of national egoism.

When economic differences between Moscow and Bucharest apparently could not be resolved during a two-week visit by Nikolai V. Podgorny, the Kremlin's emissary, it was reported¹⁶ that Khrushchev himself flew to Rumania. The outcome of these talks must not have been satisfactory, because Party boss Georghe Gheorgiu-Dej remained absent from the summit meeting of satellite leaders held in East Berlin, and *Scinteia* gave only a brief back-page report on this event.

THE WARSAW PACT

The most important treaties of a strategic nature, and indeed the only ones signed to date within the East European Bloc, have all been between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. Between 1945 and 1949 a series of bilateral treaties of friendship, collaboration, and mutual assistance¹⁷ came into effect. Each in-

corporates identical principles: close cooperation, consultation on important international questions, collaboration against German or other aggression, a ban on alliances directed against a treaty partner, strengthening political and economic as well as cultural ties, and a duration of 20 years.

Until 1955, there was no over-all treaty to which more than two of the Soviet Bloc states were signatories. The East European security system became multilateral that year by means of an 11 article 20-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance,¹⁸ signed in Warsaw at the so-called conference of European states on safeguarding peace and security in Europe. Initialed by representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the seven Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe (including Albania which has since been dropped from membership), it established a unified military command with headquarters in Moscow.¹⁹ The military command was headed by Russian Marshal Ivan S. Konev. He was succeeded in July, 1960, by another Soviet Marshal (Andrei A. Grechko), who previously had served as commanding officer of Soviet ground forces.

To test the combat efficiency of the satellite armies, extensive maneuvers were held in the fall of 1961 on the territory of the East German "Democratic" Republic,²⁰ within five miles of the West German border. These exercises involved some 22 of the 100 available divisions in the area (see Table 1), including paratroopers, as well as several thousand Soviet tanks and other heavy equipment. The following year, joint maneuvers were held again by Warsaw Pact units in Czechoslovakia and the southern part of East Germany.²¹ The second phase of these ten-day field exercises culminated with a parade at Szczecin (formerly Stettin), a port city on the Baltic Sea. In both instances apparently only Czech, East German, Polish, and Soviet troops participated, with observers from the other satellite armed forces.

The year 1962 also witnessed a sharp increase of Soviet Bloc military expenditures. Compared with the previous year, the figures in the respective budgets specifically desig-

¹⁵ *New China News Agency*, Peking (June 16, 1963).

¹⁶ *The New York Times* (July 4, 1963).

¹⁷ For an example of such a treaty, see *Dziennik Ustaw* [Journal of Laws], Warsaw, No. 47 (October 31, 1945).

¹⁸ The text appeared in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* [Cominform Journal], Bucharest (May 20, 1955).

¹⁹ H. von Krannhals, "Command Integration Within the Warsaw Pact," *Military Review*, XLI, No. 5 (May, 1961), pp. 40-52.

²⁰ For details, see Capt. E. Hinterhoff, "The Warsaw Pact," *The Tablet*, London, CCXV, No. 6337 (November 4, 1961), pp. 1049-1051.

²¹ O. Frei, "Forcierte Militarisierung der Sowjetzone," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (October 3, 1962).

Table 1
ARMED FORCES IN EAST EUROPE*

Country	Troops	Divisions**	Tanks	Security Forces
East Germany	85,000	6 (2)	1,700	60,000
Soviet troops (includes Berlin)	404,900	10 (10)	6,400	—
Poland	257,000	14 (4)	3,000	45,000
Soviet troops	30,000	1 (1)	600	—
Hungary	80,500	6 (0)	—	35,000
Soviet troops	60,000	2 (2)	1,200	—
Czechoslovakia	185,000	14 (2)	3,500	35,000
Rumania	222,000	13 (1)	1,500	60,000
Bulgaria	120,000	10 (2)	2,000	40,000
Totals	1,434,600	76 (24)	19,900	275,000

* Sources: Adapted from J. Pergent, "Les forces armées soviétiques," *Est & Ouest*, Paris, XIII, No. 258 (May 16-31, 1961), p. 17; *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militäerzeitschrift*, Zurich, CXXVII, No. 5 (May, 1961); Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliance* (London, 1962), pp. 4, 6-7; and A. Buchan, *Nato in the 1960's* (New York, 1963), Appendix, p. 158; *The New York Times*, July 28, 1963.

** Armored divisions in parentheses.

nated for defense increased as follows:²² U.S.S.R., 44.9 per cent; Hungary, 32 per cent; Poland, 16.1 per cent; Czechoslovakia, 13.9 per cent; Rumania, 13.8 per cent; and Bulgaria, 3.3 per cent. In absolute figures, the entire Soviet Bloc allocated a total of 20.3 billion rubles for defense during 1962 as against some 15.1 billion in 1961 or a net increase of five billion, i.e., some 25 per cent more. It should be noted, of course, that the foregoing represent officially released figures for armaments' expenditures. Investment in heavy industry also includes sizeable amounts spent on defense plants, although these are never acknowledged as part of the regular military budgets or made public in any detail.

PERIODIC CONFERENCES

In order to discuss future military budgets and other plans, the Warsaw Pact defense ministers hold periodic conferences. One

²² Anon., "Ostblock auf verschärftem Rüstungskurs," *Wehrkunde*, Munich, XI, No. 7 (July, 1962), p. 388; "Ungarn," *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militäerzeitschrift*, CXXIX, No. 5 (May, 1963), p. 273.

²³ *Tass* over *Radio Moscow* (February 28, 1963).

²⁴ Despite economic differences, mentioned in the next section of this article, a Rumanian military delegation headed by Defense Minister Leontin Salajan arrived in Moscow in the summer of 1963 at the invitation of Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal R. Y. Malinovsky. *The New York Times* (July 2, 1963).

such meeting to deal with questions related to the state of member armies and to coordination of military training during 1963 was held in Poland recently. The communiqué revealed only that the discussions had been "held in a spirit of complete and mutual understanding and unity."²³

This conference probably was attended by the commanding generals of Soviet troops in East Germany (I. I. Yakubovsky), Hungary (K. I. Provalov), and Poland (G. I. Khetagurov). If so, the talks included the problem of expanding future maneuvers to include Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian²⁴ troops this coming fall. Another topic possibly included problems concerning the modernization of equipment to keep up with the changes in the Soviet armed forces.

These changes are the result of stepping-up the arms race within Eastern Europe, the signal for which was apparently given soon after Khrushchev's meeting with President Kennedy at Vienna in 1961 when it became evident that there would be no disarmament agreement on Soviet terms in the near future. The Russian leader then embarked on a more aggressive policy and indicated a willingness to take greater risks, probably due to the economic difficulties within the Bloc which have made it inadvisable to strive for any compromise with the West in the foreign policy area. The arms build-up throughout

Table 2
USSR—BLOC TRADE TURNOVER
FOR 1962*

Country	Value in Rubles (billions)	Change over 1961 (in percentages)
East Germany	2.00	+ 12.0
Czechoslovakia	1.40	+ 16.0
Poland	1.00	+ 18.0
Bulgaria	0.69	+ 11.0
Hungary	0.63	+ 14.0
Rumania	0.60	+ 10.0
Total	6.32	+ 13.5 average

* Source: Based on *Vneshnyaya Torgovlya* [Foreign Trade], Moscow, XXXIV, No. 1 (January, 1963) and adapted from Radio Free Europe, *Foreign Trade of USSR With East Europe in 1962* (Munich, 1963), p. 1; mimeographed.

Eastern Europe would seem to indicate a shift in emphasis toward the purely military aspects of power²⁵ now that the loudly proclaimed economic competition between the U.S.S.R. and the United States is shaping up as a defeat for the former.

The principal instrument for harnessing the natural resources and industries of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union is the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). Restricted in membership to Communist-type states, it came into being in 1949 at Moscow²⁶ (the first session was held in April), as if in answer to the Marshall Plan. Its announced purpose was the expansion of trade relations among the "Socialist" countries and the con-

²⁵ See the article by General I. I. Batov, Chief-of-Staff for the Warsaw Pact, "Pod Znamenem Internatsionalizma" [Under the Banner of Internationalism], *Krasnaya Zvezda* [Red Star], Moscow (May 26, 1963).

²⁶ *Tass* communique over *Radio Moscow* (January 25, 1949).

²⁷ *Lidova Demokracie* [People's Democracy], Prague (May 14, 1963).

²⁸ S. Skrzypek, "Soviet-Satellite Economic Developments," *The Polish Review*, New York, VI, No. 4 (Autumn, 1961), pp. 107-114.

The tenth session in 1959 agreed to construct a 40-inch diameter international petroleum pipeline from Kuybyshev in the USSR through Plock in Poland to Schwedt in East Germany, with another branch to Bratislava in Czechoslovakia and Budapest in Hungary. V. Avrametz, "Friendship Oil Pipe-Line," *International Affairs*, Moscow, XI, No. 6 (June, 1963), p. 92, gives a map. He also indicates that over three-fifths of the 5,500 kilometer line remains uncompleted.

²⁹ Deputy Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz of Communist Poland, interviewed over *Radio Budapest* (July 31, 1960).

solidation of Bloc-member economies by pooling experience and technical assistance.

Mutual aid in the form of raw materials, food, machinery and equipment was supposed to be made available to all CEMA partners. The increased exchange of goods (see Table 2) and coordination of production are aimed ultimately at creating a pool of economic power to raise the total production of the Soviet Bloc to such an extent that it may compete in world markets.

Although somewhat dormant and even stagnating during the first decade²⁷ of its existence, a definite turning point in CEMA activities came after the May, 1958, meeting in Moscow. Directives were prepared and worked out in detail later at the regular ninth session held at Bucharest and the tenth in Prague, which adopted plans for economic cooperation in 1961-1965. These included provisions for bilateral treaties to exchange goods, to connect the grid lines for electric power of the member states, and to set up a division of labor in raw materials and industry as well as specialization in machine building.²⁸

At the twelfth meeting in Sofia during December, 1959, a statute was adopted for CEMA. It provided for specific rights, privileges, and immunities of member states. The thirteenth session was held at Budapest in 1960; it was decided to extend planning over a 20-year period, i.e., up to 1980. An interview with one of the participants indicated that Poland had proposed closer liaison for specialization and for production coordination, "pointing to the need for broader collaboration in coordinating investment plans."²⁹ (See Table 3). This proposal was in line with a previous criticism of CEMA, made by Polish Communist leader Wladyslaw Gomulka.

CEMA held its fifteenth meeting in Warsaw. It was announced that annual trade turnover among member states had risen from \$1.9 billion to some \$6.7 billion in value since 1950. (See Table 2 and note that the ruble is officially exchanged at \$1.11 by the U.S.S.R.). Division of labor, production of

Table 3
EAST EUROPEAN INVESTMENTS*
 (percentage increase over previous year)

Country	1960	1961	1962 (plan)	1962 (first half)
Bulgaria	22.0	3.5	11.0	2.0
Czechoslovakia	12.5	7.0	8.0	- 1.0
East Germany	9.0	n.a.	7.0	n.a.
Hungary	17.0	- 11.0	10.0	11.0
Poland	7.0	8.0	10.0	5.0
Rumania	32.0	21.0	16.5	16.0
Soviet Union	12.0	8.0	8.1	10.0
Averages	15.9	6.1**	10.1	7.2**

* Source: Adapted from F. S., "Verlangsamter Investitionsanstieg in Osteuropa," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (February 2, 1963).

** Since data are not available (n.a.) for East Germany, the averages have been arrived at through dividing the totals by six instead of by seven.

mineral fertilizers, and standardization of shipbuilding industries were all discussed. With regard to the single network for electric power,³⁰ the Soviet Union agreed to connect an initial 200 kw double line to the system.

For the first time, open differences of opinion were voiced at a conference of the CEMA executive committee in Moscow.³¹ Rumania's delegation reportedly spoke out against Soviet and Polish ideas for a more rapid tempo in multilateral investments and the planned changes in economic structures of member countries. No agreement could be reached on a clearing system or the proposed East European Development Bank. The U.S.S.R. was also said to have met with opposition from several other delegations, when it presented a plan for rates of exchange based on the ruble and future operation of the

CEMA Bank. This was allegedly because of a tendency to give certain advantages to the Soviet Union.³² Some of this opposition may have been eliminated at the July, 1963, CEMA executive committee meeting.

It seems that the U.S.S.R. is experiencing considerable difficulty in the attempt to develop real coordination in Eastern Europe. The prediction has been made that by early 1964 most prices of commodities in Bloc foreign trade will be equalized and that a true multilateral system will have been put into operation shortly thereafter. The proposed payments system is apparently patterned after the now defunct (West) European Payments Union which had to be financed by the United States prior to 1959, when member-state currencies became convertible. The forecast is that the ruble will attempt to exert the same kind of influence throughout the CEMA area as the dollar has done within the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, although without the transfer of capital.

³⁰ Rumania is to be discriminated against regarding per capita electricity planned for 1980, with an allocation of only 5,000 kwh as compared to 40,000 for Czechoslovakia. C. Kind, "Rumania and the East Bloc," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, Zurich, XIII, No. 3 (June, 1963), p. 5.

³¹ O. K. Osachek, "Die Comecon-Tagung in Moskau," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (May 3, 1963). It should be mentioned perhaps that Mongolia was admitted to CEMA membership in July, 1962, at a special meeting of satellite government heads in Moscow.

³² During the seven-year period ending in 1961, the satellites lost some \$6.3 billion in their trade with the U.S.S.R. due to price discrimination. A. Kutt, "Soviet-Captive Nations Trade," *East Central European Papers*, No. 6 (March, 1963), pp. 1-38; published by the Assembly of Captive European Nations, New York.

Richard F. Staar, author of *Poland 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People* (Louisiana State University Press, 1962) and a student of East European developments, is currently writing a book on *Soviet Political Warfare*. This academic year he is on leave from Emory University.

Criticizing the United States for its "unwillingness . . . to take concrete action . . . to affirm its declared policy of a free Cuba in a non-Communist hemisphere," this author underscores what he regards as the Communist threat in Latin America. In his opinion, Cuba "provides a base for future Communist expansion."

Red Drive in Cuba

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THE COMMUNIST take-over in Cuba culminated 40 years of Soviet groping to find the correct strategy for penetrating the Western Hemisphere. After World War II, Soviet acceleration of the cold war made it difficult to continue the popular front approach in Latin America and elsewhere. The new tactic adopted has been appropriately named the Guatemalan Way.¹

In applying the Guatemalan Way the Communists posed as vigorous champions of the national interest of the country involved while they secretly worked to infiltrate all militant nationalist or reformist groups which appeared to have any chance of coming to power. The Guatemalan Way did not involve the use of military force to bring countries into the Communist orbit, as was the case in China and Eastern Europe. By this method the Communists did not seek power

under their own colors but as democratic nationalists. The prime virtue, for the Communists, in this process lies in the fact that the Red drive "does not appear to be communism."²

The Guatemalan Way worked well in Guatemala under Arévalo and Arbenz, but its results were negated by Communist failure to consolidate their position rapidly enough, especially within the armed forces. When Castillo Armas invaded in 1954 with a tiny force of anti-Communists, army neutrality was the decisive factor. Yet the original formula of militant anti-Yankeeism coupled with support of nationalistic reforms proved to be an appealing combination. It continues to be the central maneuver in the Communist effort to acquire Latin America.

The classic example of the Communist application of the "Guatemalan Way" was in Cuba where the anti-Batista revolution provided the necessary nationalistic opening. In this case the deception was considerably more studied. Even if Castro's claim to have been Communist-minded from his university days is discounted, the core of his 26th of July group was heavily infiltrated before he established himself in the Sierra Maestra. The 26th of July movement's statements issued from the mountains were entirely non-Communist and even anti-Communist. After Batista fled and Castro took over the decep-

¹ An excellent analysis of the Guatemalan Way was given by Raymond G. Leddy of the U.S. Department of State in "Communist Aggression in Latin America," *Ninth Interim Report of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Latin America of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, 83d Cong., 2d Session, 1954, p. 199.*

² Daniel James, *Red Design for the Americas* (N. Y.: John Day, 1954), p. 20. James, one of the best informed students of communism in Latin America, does not use the term Guatemalan Way. Yet, his concept of "Maoism" as applied in Guatemala is the same as that given in Leddy's testimony on the Guatemalan Way. James appropriately compares the process to the European cuckoo's habit of laying its eggs in other bird's nests.

tion was continued until effective opposition was destroyed, the army and police reorganized and power consolidated. Thus Che Guevara, at a secret meeting of the Communist-led Cuban officialdom in June of 1959, admonished those present not to repeat anything discussed because, he said, "at these meetings, we talk about *what we are going to do*, and not what we tell the people we are going to do. These are seldom the same thing."³

SOVIET AID TO CUBA

The Soviet Union (the nation which has established a major military base in Castro's Cuba) made a discreet but effective contribution to the success of the 26th of July movement. Apart from providing training and cash for Castro's spearhead forces in Mexico and assigning to them important military figures like Alberto Bayo, they may have supplied the revolution with a limited number of arms landed from submarines.⁴ Ironically, major arms shipments from pro-democratic groups within and without Cuba (many from the United States) made it unnecessary for the Soviets to invest much equipment in the effort. This situation had the happy advantage for the Communists of assisting them in maintaining the great deception practiced on the Cuban people.

Soviet penetration of Cuba was given open, professional status when a Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastas Mikoyan, came for the first time in February of 1960 and stayed two weeks. He opened a Russian Trade Fair, laid a wreath on the grave of José Martí, gave a ruthlessly atheistic speech to a huge crowd in Havana, and busied himself in numerous small activities generally connected with visits by foreign dignitaries. Most impor-

tantly, no doubt, he talked quietly with key Cuban officials, laying plans for turning the island into a major Soviet bastion. At that time the emphasis was on trade and economic aid, but military commitments were implied.

In April the first shipment of Soviet crude oil arrived in Cuba, and on May 8 the two countries established diplomatic relations. Ties with Poland and Czechoslovakia followed and shipments from the Soviet bloc assumed major proportions. On July 9, 1960, Premier Khrushchev publicly acclaimed the Cuban revolution in a famous speech which included his boast that Soviet artillerymen were ready to support Cuba with rockets.

Raúl Castro, brother of the revolutionary leader, visited Moscow during that summer in his capacity as Armed Forces Minister. He apparently succeeded in convincing cautious Soviet leaders that Cuba without weapons was vulnerable, but that with major military assistance Castro's Cuba could become the most important Red advance since the acquisition of mainland China in 1949. The first Communist ships bearing arms came to Cuba in July, 1960, although the United States did not take official notice of these developments until November. Then the United States government merely announced that at least 28,000 tons of Soviet bloc arms had been supplied to Cuba.

The Soviet-Cuban joint communiqué of December 19, 1960, in effect established an alliance between the two countries. Castro held a large military parade in Havana on January 2, 1961, to show off his new weapons. Tanks, assault guns, and field guns were on display. Fidel boasted that they were only a small part of the arms which his disinterested Communist friends had supplied him. In February Raúl Castro announced that Red China had contributed to Cuban strength in the form of hundreds of machine guns.⁵

By April, 1961, the conversion of Cuba into an important Communist base was well advanced. The State Department White Paper on Cuba, issued on April 3, indicated that the flood of arms from the Soviet bloc had reached 30,000 tons valued at \$50 million. Russian and Czech military technicians were

³ Account given by Manuel F. Artime as quoted in James Monahan and Kenneth O. Gilmore, *The Great Deception* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1963), p. 51.

⁴ July 14, 1959, Hearing before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, "Communist Threat to the United States Through the Caribbean" Series, Part 1, Testimony of Major Pedro L. Diaz Lanz, p. 15.

⁵ A very useful chronology of developments in Cuba, *Events in United States-Cuban Relations, 1957-1963*, was published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 29, 1963.

in Cuba, and Cuban soldiers and airmen were training in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The White Paper concluded that

As a consequence of Soviet military aid, Cuba has . . . , except for the United States, the largest ground forces in the hemisphere—at least ten times as large as the military forces maintained by previous Cuban governments, including that of Batista. Estimates of the size of the Cuban military establishment range from 250,000 to 400,000. On the basis of the lower figure, one out of every 30 Cubans is . . . in the armed forces as against one out of 50 in the Soviet Union and one out of 60 in the United States.

The Soviet presence in Cuba⁶ was also illustrated by Castro's trade shift to the point where 75 per cent of Cuban goods were committed to Red bloc countries; previously only 2 per cent had been sent to this market. In cultural relations, including the arts, education, athletics, books and the press, Communist planners in Havana and Moscow had made a "massive attempt to impose an alien cultural pattern on the Cuban people."⁷

In sum, it appears that the Soviet commitment to Cuba was instrumental in the defeat of the badly mismanaged attempt to unseat Castro by the invasion of *Bahía de Cochinos*, April 17–19, 1961.

BAY OF PIGS AFTERMATH

Within less than a year after the failure of this invasion, Sino-Soviet military bloc support for Castro had doubled. The Soviets became convinced that their beachhead, established insolently close to the United States, was tenable. Jet fighter planes, patrol vessels, torpedo boats, and all types of artillery and small arms were added to the Cuban arsenal. Sometime between the end of March

⁶ *Cuba*, Department of State publication 7171, released April, 1961, p. 23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁸ Daniel James and John G. Hubbell, *Strike in the West: The Complete Story of the Cuban Crisis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), pp. 54–55. This brief book is an excellent, exciting summary of the background and events of the October, 1962, Cuban missile crisis.

⁹ The best brief survey of the facts of the military build-up was printed in the *Investigation of the Preparedness Program: The Cuban Military Buildup*, Interim Report of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, May 9, 1963.

and the beginning of July, 1962, Soviet experts decided to enter upon a major gamble in Cuba. The country was perfectly situated to serve as a missile base against the United States. If intermediate range missiles could be placed there swiftly and secretly, practically all American cities and military bases would be in easy range.

Would the United States react in time and stop the Soviet move? Khrushchev had the evidence of the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion to indicate that she would not. In September, 1962, at a time when his missile plans were nearing their climax, he scoffingly told visiting poet Robert Frost that the United States was "too liberal to fight."

The daring Soviet missile gambit in Cuba is a striking example of the great advantages that a secretive, totalitarian power can sometimes exercise over a democratic nation dedicated to international legality. Communist missiles based in the *Soviet Union* placed America's *European* allies at a disadvantage, but had limited meaning in the Western Hemisphere. By making *Cuba* a missile base the Kremlin could effect a similar advantage over the *Latin* allies of the United States; and, very importantly, the Soviets would also place the United States itself directly under the gun.⁸

In mid-July, the Soviet Union markedly increased her assistance to Cuba. Judged by ship arrivals alone the step-up was alarming. For the first half of 1962 the Soviets sent a monthly average of 15 dry cargo ships to Cuba. In August, there were 37. From January through May, 1962, United States intelligence counted only one Soviet passenger ship entering Cuba; four came in July and six during August. Refugee and other personal reports from Cuba indicated that combat troops and long range missiles were the two new components in the Communist arsenal, but night unloadings and the generally high degree of secrecy maintained obscured these facts. Air surveillance from the United States was increased but failed, at first, to confirm the human resource reports.⁹

The events following President Kennedy's dramatic speech of October 22, 1962, are

well known. With American armed might partially mobilized and public opinion fully behind him, the President was able to force the Soviets, first, to admit that they had sneaked missiles into Cuba and, second, to withdraw them along with the long range bomber force which had also been brought in. With a skillful mixture of publicity of the facts, military blockade and political pressure through the United Nations and the Organization of American States, the Administration succeeded in blunting the Soviet advance in the Western Hemisphere. The "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation, the most pointed in the history of the cold war, resulted in a Soviet backdown.

However, the outcome of the October crisis should not lead to unwarranted optimism. That the Soviets were willing to commit as much wealth as they did to such a gambit is in itself a sobering thought. The effort involved 175 ships and cost about three-quarters of a billion dollars. This amount must be considered in the light of the Soviet gross national product which is not more than one-third that of the United States. Admittedly, the Soviets do not allocate to such efforts according to Western accounting methods, yet an equivalent United States commitment to a single military installation would be the significant sum of more than \$2 billion.

Furthermore, Cuba remains a Communist base in the Western Hemisphere. Contrary to both the Monroe Doctrine and the Rio Treaty, and despite the United States victory in the missile crisis, the Soviets have retained their puppet regime. The opportunities remain for using it as a base for further penetration into Latin America. The long range missiles and bombers were probably withdrawn, but the Soviet military presence remains.

Much debate in the United States regarding the number of Soviet troops still in Cuba

has clarified neither their quantity nor their exact type and status. Optimistic observers believe that only 12,000–13,000 remain, while more pessimistic sources insist that there are at least 40,000 combat troops. The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, after exhaustive investigation, concluded that "no really hard evidence" exists of the number of Soviet units and that "no one—outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles—knows how many Russian troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure."¹⁰

Not only is the number of Soviet troops in doubt; their specific activities are unclear. At least 24 SA-2 missile sites with six launchers each are known to exist in a defensive ring around the entire perimeter of Cuba. This weapon, an excellent imitation of the United States Nike-Hercules, provides a high measure of air defense for the island. Doubtless all are manned by Soviet units; the complexity of the fire control system as well as the weapon itself requires extensive training to operate. In addition to the SA-2's, at least four cruise-missile sites exist. These missiles have a range up to 40 miles from their launch position and are manned by Russian naval crews. Other cruise-type missiles are placed on a dozen *Komar*, high speed patrol craft, operated by Cuban sailors under Soviet command.

There are at least two additional modern Soviet tactical missiles operable in Cuba, the *Snapper* and the *Frog*. The latter is similar to the United States *Honest John* and can be used with a nuclear warhead. Moreover, there are unknown quantities of conventional weapons, including anti-aircraft batteries, mortars, assault guns, anti-tank cannon and so forth. It is impossible to determine exactly which weapons are manned exclusively by Soviet crews. The Cuban army is estimated to have 75,000 regular troops plus 200,000 in the militia and home guard.¹¹

ADVANTAGES OF A CUBAN BASE

Tactical analysis suggests that several advantages accrue to the Soviets as long as they are able to maintain their Cuban base. Within Cuba, the Castro regime is insulated

¹⁰ *Investigation of the Preparedness Program: The Cuban Military Buildup*, Interim Report of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, May 9, 1963, p. 14.

¹¹ Military information can be found in the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee Report, *Ibid*.

against internal revolt as well as protected from invasion by forces based outside the island. While United States government spokesmen, including the President, have insisted that no "Hungary" will be allowed in Cuba, the presence of Soviet troops is a significant psychological deterrent to United States implementation of this pledge.

Within the hemisphere Cuba has become the most important Communist base for training Latin nationals in revolutionary, agitational, and sabotage techniques. These trainees may infiltrate from Cuba into other Latin American countries including Panama. The island is also a transmission center for all manner of propaganda, monetary and other support to subversive groups in the hemisphere. In addition Cuba is an unraidable meeting place for Communist conferences and planning sessions.

In the global context of the cold war the island serves as an advance intelligence base for the U.S.S.R. It has a potential as a submarine and electronic warfare center. Cuba continues to provide a place where strategic missiles may be reintroduced. Some analysts contend that this has already been accomplished by means of caves and underground installations. No responsible source, private or public, has categorically denied this possibility. Perhaps the most significant advantage which the Soviet Union gains from its continued position in Cuba is the harm rendered to the United States' image and prestige with its allies and others.

The connections between the firm Soviet lodgment in Cuba and stepped up offensives elsewhere in the hemisphere are not hard to trace.¹² Communist tactics in the Americas, as elsewhere, are flexible and generally adapted to the conditions in the target coun-

try. In keeping with the Cuban formula there appear to be three main approaches at present: (1) terroristic guerrilla warfare, (2) popular electoral fronts, and (3) infiltration of military and civilian positions of power.¹³ These methods are well illustrated by the current cases of Venezuela, Chile, and Brazil.

VENEZUELA, CHILE, BRAZIL

Competent observers feel that Venezuela has achieved the unhappy distinction of being selected as the prime Communist target in the hemisphere. Since the October crisis most of the important Cuban leaders, including Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Carlos Rodriguez, Blas Roca, and Armando Hart, have spoken publicly of the need for exporting violent revolution.¹⁴ The F.A.L.N. (*Fuerzas Armadas de la Liberación Nacional*) in Venezuela probably numbers no more than 1,500 revolutionists. This number is adequate for the task of blowing up oil lines, burning buildings, and murdering individuals. Guerrilla units operate widely in the Venezuelan mountains in the remote interior, but they have also on occasion linked up with pro-Communist groups in the cities. Twice in 1962, first at Carupano and then at Puerto Cabello, young military officers attempted *golpes* which were only put down after considerable damage and bloodshed. During the missile crisis radio orders from Cuba went to saboteurs in the oil fields. Oil lines and electric power stations were blown up and more than one-sixth of the nation's oil production was halted. The total damage came to at least \$2 million.

During 1963 Sears Roebuck, one of the most successful United States business operations in Latin America, was the target of Red arsonists. The Sears warehouse in Caracas was burned to the ground and \$2.5 million worth of merchandise was destroyed. A bold attack on a United States Army mission in Caracas resulted in the destruction of the building and the humiliation of the officers and men on duty there. The Good-year Tire and Rubber Company lost a warehouse on June 10.

¹² An excellent source is the *O.A.S. Special Committee Report on Castro-Communist Subversion in the Hemisphere*, issued June 4, 1963. See also *This Changing World*, Armed Forces Information and Education, Department of Defense, Vol. 2, No. 19, April 1, 1963.

¹³ See Richard Armstrong, "How the Communists Plan to Win Latin America," *Saturday Evening Post*, June 29 to July 6, 1963, pp. 20-34.

¹⁴ *O.A.S. Special Committee Report on Castro-Communist Subversion in the Hemisphere*, issued June 4, 1963, pp. 6-8, 42-47.

But the terrorists have not limited themselves to attacks on United States owned installations. Local nationals have also been harmed by the F.A.L.N. Venezuelan factories, banks, hotels, public buildings and even the most important military air base at Boca del Rio have been bombed, burned or shot up. Several Communist attempts to assassinate President Rómulo Betancourt have been frustrated. French paintings from the Louvre on loan to the University of Caracas were stolen and a Venezuelan freighter was hijacked and taken to Brazil.

The attacks are designed to bring down the Betancourt government in Venezuela and open possibilities for a Communist take-over either under a new military dictatorship or by direct assault. Chances of success may be remote, but the Communists obviously believe that terrorism is the most fruitful approach to the situation in Venezuela. With its immense oil reserves and strategic position it would be a rich prize indeed.

In Chile the Communist party has long had a high degree of acceptance among intellectuals and in some political circles. Pablo Neruda, the nation's most distinguished poet, is proud to be a Communist. The popular front in Chile piled success on success until at one time in 1946 Communists held three posts in the cabinet of President Gonzales Videla, whom they helped to elect. For a while the Red tide receded, but in 1958 F.R.A.P. (*Frente de Acción Popular*), the latest version of the popular front, missed the presidency by only 35,000 votes. Senator Salvador Allende, a Socialist from Santiago, has again been selected to lead the popular front in the presidential election campaign in 1964.

While the municipal elections of April, 1963, did not result in the major gains which some had predicated for Allende's coalition, the Communist-influenced faction did receive more votes than any popular front grouping has yet been able to gain. Allende admires Fidel Castro immensely and keeps

a copy of the Cuban leader's Second Declaration of Havana (essentially a declaration of war on all hemisphere governments) on the wall of his office. The Senator has said that when he is elected he will make Chile "the second free nation in Latin America."¹⁵

Chile's remote position makes her a somewhat less valuable strategic prize than Venezuela, but her huge copper reserves are a significant item. Moreover, she has long held the distinction of being one of the most stable democracies in Latin America. Should the Communists succeed in winning the country by electoral maneuvering, they would further weaken the already failing structure of self-government in Latin America as well as achieve their first major electoral success in the world.

In Brazil all three Communists tactics are being used. Francisco Julião is attempting to develop a guerrilla front with his peasant leagues in the northeast. Federal Deputy Leonel Brizola is working to have himself elected president in 1956 through a popular labor front. But the most important method being used in huge, populous Brazil is that of infiltration into key power positions. When Janio Quadros resigned in August, 1961, he left a political vacuum at the top of the nation's power structure which has not yet been filled. Vice-President João Goulart succeeded to the presidency by a series of clever maneuvers over the strong opposition of the anti-Communist elements in the Brazilian army.

Goulart himself is not a Communist, but his actions and appointments so often assist the Communist cause that he could well serve as the facade for a complete Communist take-over in Brazil. Raul Ryff, his press secretary, is a well-known Communist and so is Ryff's wife Beatrix. Several members of the governing board of SUDENE, the development corporation for the depressed northeast area, have been identified as Party members. Miguel Arraes, Communist-supported Governor of Pernambuco State where SUDENE operates, has put Party members in key posts in the state administration. Communists and pro-Communists are to be found in many

¹⁵ Armstrong, "How the Communists Plan to Win Latin America," *Saturday Evening Post*, June 29 to July 6, 1963, p. 32.

agencies of the Brazilian government.¹⁶ If, as is apparently the case, the more or less well-known Communists are merely the surface manifestation of a large Communist iceberg, the situation is indeed serious.

Brazil, with half the land and more than a third of the population of Latin America, has common borders with all the South American nations except Chile and Ecuador. South-eastern Brazil, including the important urban centers of Belo Horizonte, Rio, São Paulo, and Porto Alegre, and the capital at Brasília, is the great manufacturing district of Latin America. Loss of this area to Communist rule would be a crushing defeat for the Alliance for Progress. Communist capture of power in Brazil would be a victory of major proportions, dwarfing the Communist conquest of Cuba.

REWOOLING OF CASTRO

It must have been with some or all of these potentials in mind that the Kremlin dispatched Anastas Mikoyan to Cuba for a second time on November 2, 1962, following the easing of the missile crisis. His mission was to preserve the Soviet base of operations in Cuba. Reports indicate that Castro was anything but cordial. He was angry because Khrushchev had dealt with the United States without consulting him, especially in regard to on-site inspection which Castro, understandably enough, believed to be a violation of Cuban sovereignty. Mikoyan stayed for over three weeks. He apparently convinced the Cuban leader that any move to lessen his Soviet ties would lead to the end of his rule.

When Castro went to Russia in May, 1963, the rewooling process was completed. The visit had several purposes. In addition to healing Castro's wounded pride, Kremlin leaders no doubt sought to bring Cuba to the Kremlin's side in the ideological battle

between the Soviet Union and Red China as well as to plan future Communist moves in Latin America. For 40 days Castro was given every possible attention by Soviet leaders. He travelled to many cities and was shown farms, dams, housing projects, schools, factories. He was promised a sugar subsidy, a new cane-gathering machine, and all necessary military defense against the United States. As a final gesture he was awarded the Order of Lenin and made a Hero of the Soviet Union, the first time this honor was ever extended to a foreigner.

Castro returned to Cuba apparently convinced that his greatest friend was Nikita Khrushchev. In his television report to the Cuban people, Castro praised the Soviet Union and Khrushchev (who apparently spent most of the 40 days with Castro) exorbitantly; he concluded with the revealing assertion that Khrushchev "is without a doubt one of the most brilliant intellects that I have ever known." A disturbing feature of Castro's report was its heavy emphasis on the amount of economic assistance which the Soviets plan to supply to Cuba. Castro is clearly convinced that the Soviets are in the island permanently. Official Communist accounts published in the United States make this conviction explicit.¹⁷

The Soviets are compelled to "allocate" large amounts to maintain their Cuban base. Besides the three-quarters of a billion dollars invested in the missile placement, they spend at least \$1 million daily to supply economic and military support to Castro. This is more than one-third of the United States commit-

(Continued on page 242)

¹⁶ The Communist infiltration of the Brazilian government caused a minor diplomatic flap between Brazil and the United States when the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee released a report on the subject including testimony by Lincoln Gordon, United States Ambassador to Brazil. *The New York Times*, March 18, 19, 21, 1963.

¹⁷ See Victor Perlo, "Castro's Great Speech," *The Worker*, July 7, 1963, p. 5.

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"The present state of tension between the leaders of Communist China and the U.S.S.R. may stem from Khrushchev's decision to sacrifice the strengths of the Sino-Soviet partnership upon the altar of traditional Western statecraft."

Sino-Soviet Tensions

By PETER S. H. TANG

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THE AGONIZING failure of Sino-Soviet unity displayed during the July, 1963, ideological talks held in Lenin Hills, Moscow, opened a new chapter in the history of the international Communist movement.* More basic questions were raised than answered. Would world communism be forced to abandon its claims to monolithic unity, electing instead the path of polycentrism or bicentrism? Might Marxism-Leninism itself come to serve as no more than a camouflage for national interests?

The Soviet and Chinese Communist parties and states continue to profess "the same aim, the same aspirations and hopes" and claim to "spare no effort to strengthen fraternal friendship."¹ Yet the observer, recalling the Yugoslav experience of 1948 and the Albanian lesson of 1961, cannot escape the essential question: have the two Communist giants wandered so far from the Communist dream as to willfully precipitate an irrevocable rupture?

* This article is based on a larger study entitled "Sino-Soviet Relations: Retrospect and Prospect" to be published as a book by the Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Chestnut Hill, Mass., late in 1963.

¹ The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "Open Letter to all Party Organizations and Communists of the Soviet Union," *Pravda*, July 14, 1963; *The New York Times*, July 15, 1963; referred to hereinafter as "CPSU, Open Letter."

² For a comparative case study see Peter S. H. Tang, *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia 1911-1931* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1959), pp. 1-455.

Since the seventeenth century, Russian and then Soviet policies toward pre-Communist China consistently followed a familiar pattern—encroachment and hegemony through political, economic and, if necessary, military means.² The Communist party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.), formerly known as the All-Union Communist party (Bolshevikov) in the forty-odd intervening years since the birth of the Communist party of China (C.P.C.) has systematically and painstakingly assumed the roles of sponsor, tutor and finally partner. Throughout this long history, the relationship has never been so perplexing and confused, nor so subject to theoretical and practical divergencies and contradictions in program and conduct as it is today.

The credit for launching communism in China belongs to Lenin, who founded the C.P.C. in 1921, and admitted it to Comintern membership a year later. Soviet tutelage of the infant C.P.C. was continued through the work of men like V. (Besso) Lominadze, Heinz Neumann, Mikhail Borodin, M. N. Roy and Pavel Mif; Stalin himself drew China into his power struggle with Leon Trotsky. Stalin offered a five-point strategy for revolution in China, namely, (1) leadership of the proletariat and its Communist party; (2) alliance with the peasantry; (3) armed revolution against armed counter-revolution; (4) united front tactics; and (5) a transitional soviet regime leading towards

socialism.³ This strategy was used by Mao Tse-tung not only in his power conquest of the Chinese mainland, but also in his endeavor to promote the national liberation movement by providing a revolutionary model appropriate to less developed areas.⁴

In the C.P.C.'s final victory, the consistency of Soviet protection and support certainly meant as much as Stalin's stratagem. After the Chinese Communist Long March, a survival struggle against Chiang Kai-shek's annihilation campaigns, Stalin used the Comintern to promote the united front in 1935. He then meddled in the 1936 Sian Incident and in the precipitation of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. During these years, the Soviets promoted the image of the Chinese Communists as "agrarian reformers." Even as late as 1944 and 1945, Stalin and Molotov were diverting attention from the mainland and evading any criticism of Soviet responsibility therein by insisting to American representatives that the members of the C.P.C. were simply no more than "margarine Communists."⁵

Yet, at the same time, the Soviets purposefully violated the terms of their 1945 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Nationalist government by transferring captured Japanese arms and leaving much of Manchuria to the Chinese Communists. In the wake of the Chinese Communist victory, Stalin immediately made China an affiliate, with the temporary status of a semi-satellite. Maintaining railway and port concessions in Manchuria and joint stock companies in Sinkiang, he further capitalized upon Peking's blood-letting to promote communism in the war in Korea. The return of the Chinese Chang-

chun Railway at the end of 1952 and of Port Arthur and Dairen in 1955, Communist China's contributions in Korea, together with the new look in the Kremlin following Stalin's death, served to exalt Peking's stature.

Peking's co-leadership of the Soviet bloc was perhaps established officially in February, 1955, with Molotov's report to the Supreme Soviet. The partnership was further strengthened when Peking intervened to avert a possible collapse of the Soviet satellite empire and to consolidate the Communist camp following the revolution in Hungary in October, 1956. Peking also played an outstanding role in the "world socialist system" program promulgated by the 1957 Moscow Declaration, and in following the initial Soviet lead of severely denouncing Yugoslav revisionism. Therefore, at least up to 1957, Soviet relations with Communist China clearly seemed to be based on respect, aid and collaboration.

PRESENT PERPLEXITIES

The Chinese Communists and the Soviets have respectively designated 1959 and 1960 as the beginning of their increasing differences, thus implicitly confirming the assumption that previously differences were those of awkwardness or uncertainty in approach (e. g., the communes), rather than of a doctrinal nature. Since then, despite the C.P.C.'s lip service prior to the issuance of the 1960 Eighty-One Parties Statement, Soviet leadership of the international Communist movement has been subject to continuous questioning. Differences over the Sino-Indian border clashes since 1959 reflect growing divergencies.

Although the Soviet expression of regret for the clashes was probably necessary, due to the importance of nonaligned nations in the international united front, the fact that the C.P.C. dates present difficulties from this period indicates a general failure to achieve agreement, coordination, or consultation on a major issue. Ideological harmony suffered further setbacks with Soviet admonishment at the June, 1960, Rumanian Party Congress, of Chinese Communist theoretical formulations advanced in an article, "Long Live

³ For a detailed treatment see Peter S. H. Tang, "Stalin's Role in the Communist Victory in China," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. XIII, No. 3 (October, 1954), pp. 375-388, and Peter S. H. Tang, *Communist China Today*, Vol. I: *Domestic and Foreign Policies*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D. C.: Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1961), pp. 19-25.

⁴ For further discussion see Peter S. H. Tang, *Communist China as a Developmental Model for Underdeveloped Countries* (Washington, D. C.: Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1960), pp. 1-110.

⁵ Similar approaches were later used in the cases of Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro.

Leninism.”⁶ However, as witnessed in the remarkable wording of the 1960 Moscow statement, Communist semanticism and dialectics can permit or veil differences.⁷

Obscure Soviet policies seemed to become clearer with the mass recall of Russian technicians from China and the curtailment of trade between Communist China and the U.S.S.R. and its East European allies (with the exception of Albania). In attempting to isolate and attack the position of the Albanian and Chinese Communist parties, at the twenty-second C.P.S.U. Congress in October, 1961, the Soviets gave further warning by publicly repudiating and threatening to “excommunicate” Albania. The successive chain of events—Chou En-lai’s warning that open denunciation would jeopardize inter-party relations, Soviet refusal to heed this warning as expressed in an intensification of criticism, Chou’s dramatic departure before the conclusion of the congress, Mao’s articulate public endorsement of the Chinese position as illustrated in his rare appearance

at Peking airport to welcome Chou—indicated further Russo-Chinese difficulties.

Subsequent events sharpened the conflict. These included Soviet rejection of the earlier Chinese-endorsed proposal for a meeting of Communist and Workers’ parties,⁸ employment of the platforms of several party congresses⁹ and of international front organizations to attack the Chinese Communists, and journalistic polemics. In the latter case, the Soviets ignored the principle of reciprocity for publication of documents by initially refusing to print the C.P.C. Central Committee letter of June 14, 1963, addressed to its C.P.S.U. counterpart,¹⁰ but also engaged in inflammatory statements concerning the expulsion of five Chinese Communists from the U.S.S.R. and the welcome accorded them in China. Khrushchev’s designed slight of the C.P.C. delegates at the July ideological talks only added to an already tense atmosphere.

An awareness of Sino-Soviet tensions, however, cannot by itself ensure reasonably correct assessments of the precise nature and extent of the quarrel; nor will it clarify motivations. When Communist parties and states engage in open antagonism, the issue cannot be confined to national interests, but involves basic interpretations of Communist ideology, strategy and tactics.

THE IDEOLOGICAL FRONT

On the ideological front, Soviet policies toward Communist China involve a basic attitude toward Marxism-Leninism, interpreted in the 1957 Moscow Declaration and the 1960 Moscow Statement, and related theoretical formulations concerning war, peace, peaceful coexistence, national liberation movements, the transition to socialism and the proletarian dictatorship. The Russians emphasize the so-called creative approach to Marxist-Leninist theory in accordance with “changing conditions . . . and the tasks with which the Party is confronted at different historical stages.”¹¹ The C.P.C., however, insists that this practice is only a way to “cast aside the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism.”¹² Convinced that Russian conduct betrays the 1957 Moscow Dec-

⁶ The editorial department of the *Hung Ch’i (Hongqi)* Magazine, “Le-Nin-Chu-I Wan-sui” (“Long Live Leninism”), *Hung Ch’i (Hongqi) (Red Flag)*, No. 8, April 16, 1960, pp. 1–29. For the English version of this article see *Long Live Leninism* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1960), pp. 1–55.

⁷ The flexibility of the dialectic and the usages of semantics in the interpretation of Marxist-Leninist concepts are treated in Peter S. H. Tang, “Moscow and Peking: The Question of War and Peace,” *Orbis*, Vol. V, No. 1 (Spring, 1961), pp. 15–30.

⁸ The Central Committee of the C.P.C. wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. on April 7, 1962, in support of this proposal made by the Communist party of Indonesia, the Workers’ party of Vietnam, and the Communist parties of Sweden, Great Britain and New Zealand. See the Central Committee of the C.P.C. to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Letter, March 9, 1963, in “Chinese and Soviet Parties Exchange Letters,” *Peking Review* No. 12, March 22, 1963, p. 7.

⁹ Notably at the 10th Congress of the Italian C.P. and at the 12th Congress of the Czechoslovak C.P., both in December, 1962, and at the 6th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany in January, 1963.

¹⁰ The Central Committee of the C.P.C. to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Letter, June 14, 1963, English text in *Peking Review* and in *The New York Times* July 5, 1963.

¹¹ B. N. Ponomarev, Report at Formal Meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses Celebrating the 93rd Anniversary of the Birth of V. I. Lenin, *Pravda*, April 23, 1963.

¹² C.P.C., Letter, June 14, 1963.

laration and the 1960 Eighty-One Parties' Statement and unsatisfied with the C.P.S.U.'s vacillating direction of the international Communist movement, the C.P.C. has increasingly demanded strict adherence to the general line. This general line, according to the Chinese Communists, is guided by Marxist-Leninist theory concerning the historical mission of the proletariat and is embodied in both the 1957 and the 1960 Moscow pronouncements.

The C.P.S.U. maintains that the Chinese definition of the general line is "without due consideration for the peculiarities of the modern stage of history," and no more than a C.P.C. "guise" to "impose on the world communist movement" its own "erroneous and disastrous course."¹³

The same conflict in ideology prevails in the related issues of war, peace and peaceful coexistence. Peace, for the Soviets, is a useful banner to "rally the broadest masses" and "build a mass political army,"¹⁴ and while war is now fatal, it is not a fatal inevitability.¹⁵ Peaceful coexistence therefore becomes "the only sensible principle for relations between countries with differing social systems," and also "creates favorable conditions for the development of the class struggle of the working people in capitalist countries and for the development of the national liberation movement."¹⁶ Victories in economic competition, insists Khrushchev, can "exert a decisive influence on the course of world development."

The Chinese Communists, who might well claim, after Lenin, authorship of the policy of peaceful coexistence,¹⁷ have chosen to emphasize its limitations. As phrased by the

¹³ C.P.S.U., Open Letter.

¹⁴ "Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement in the Name of the Triumph of Peace and Socialism" (Editorial), *Pravda*, Jan. 7, 1963.

¹⁵ C.P.S.U., Open Letter.

¹⁶ N. S. Khrushchev, Speech at Rally of Friendship between the Peoples of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Cuba, *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*, May 24, 1963.

¹⁷ The C.P.C. actually utilized this concept in 1954 and in 1955 to advance the five principles of peaceful coexistence, before Khrushchev seized upon it as the most important issue of the present era.

¹⁸ C.P.C., Letter, June 14, 1963.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

C.P.C. Central Committee, peaceful coexistence must never be described as "the main content of the transition from capitalism to socialism," or be made "the general line of the foreign policy of socialist countries" to the exclusion of "proletarian internationalism" and revolutionary struggles.¹⁸ Peaceful economic competition might inspire peoples, but it cannot "replace" such struggle. The C.P.S.U.'s minimization of the national liberation movement, the Chinese Communists maintain, betrays proletarian interests particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, where imperialism is most vulnerable. Although peaceful transition is preferable to military action, it cannot be upheld as a firm strategic principle capable of universal application. While Khrushchev calls the C.P.S.U. the "party of the entire people" and the U.S.S.R. the "state of the whole people," the Chinese Communists angrily challenge this "bourgeois theory of state." The Chinese demand uncompromising struggle against modern revisionism and dogmatism, the latter including blind imitation of the C.P.S.U. policies or programs.¹⁹

STRATEGIC ISSUES

Communist strategies, generally speaking, are long-term, basic directions essential to the realization of the goals expressed in Marxist-Leninist ideology. Since the initial duty of the Communist is to distinguish himself from the enemy, cardinal strategies include proletarian internationalism in inter-party relations to strengthen internal unity and the struggle against external class enemies. In terms of strategy, Soviet policies toward China have run into tremendous difficulties on these counts.

In the realm of inter-party relations, Communist China has uncompromisingly challenged Soviet policies toward Albania and Yugoslavia. The Soviets openly repudiated the leaders of the Albanian Party of Labor for making "direct attacks on the lines of the 20th Congress of the CPSU," for questioning the policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition to socialism, and for errors of "dogmatism, sectarianism and viru-

lent nationalism."²⁰ Peking insists no less vigorously that Yugoslavia should not be considered a "socialist country" or an "anti-imperialist force." China has attacked "certain persons" said to be "attempting to introduce the Yugoslav revisionist clique into the socialist community."²¹ The C.P.S.U. response has taken the form of excommunications of the C.P.C. for its intent to "excommunicate" Yugoslavia, thereby possibly driving it into the "camp of imperialism."²²

Both Moscow and Peking have hurled heated accusations that the other has engaged in efforts to destroy the general unity of the Communist world. The Soviets have charged the C.P.C. with attempts to undermine the unity of the international Communist movement by "organizing and supporting various anti-party groups of renegades who came out against the Communist parties in the United States, Brazil, Italy, Belgium, Australia and India," and for "conducting subversive activities in the Communist and Workers' Parties in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America."²³

Yet the Chinese Communists have been equally emphatic in insisting that the C.P.S.U. be held responsible for "splitting action" between fraternal parties, particularly in the form of an "open call for a change in the Albanian Party and state leadership." Thus the C.P.C. warns that the standards of proletarian internationalism are binding upon all and that the principles of independence

and equality among Communist parties prohibit "any party to place itself above the others . . . to impose the program, resolutions and line of one's own party on other fraternal parties as the 'common program of the international Communist movement.'"²⁴

The principle of proletarian internationalism applies to relations between Communist and non-Communist states as well as between fraternal parties and Communist-controlled countries. Consequently, Peking viewed with alarm the Soviet expressions of neutrality and regret with respect to the Sino-Indian border clash, and subsequent Soviet aid to India. By the same token, Soviet evacuation of the offensive weapons the U.S.S.R. had previously installed in Cuba with little regard for Cuban sovereignty is denounced by the Chinese Communists as capitulation following an adventurist act.²⁵

In relations with the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the Communist camp has striven to promote an anti-imperialist international united front. In this strategy, too, the Communist giants have engaged in mutual recriminations. Responding to Chinese Communist charges of minimizing the importance of this struggle, the C.P.S.U. has charged that the Chinese party seeks to manipulate the national liberation movement "to win in the easiest way popularity among the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America," even at the expense of the Socialist camp itself.²⁶

POLICIES TOWARD THE U.S.

Policies toward the United States show equally wide differences. Although both Communist countries regard the United States as the outstanding target of the world revolution, the C.P.S.U. has clearly declared that it "will never follow" the road which the Chinese Communists regard as "advantageous to them"—namely, "the preservation and intensification of international tension, especially in the relations between the USSR and the US." But the C.P.C. has no less firmly averred that "to make no distinction between enemies, friends and ourselves and to entrust the fate of the people and of man-

²⁰ "Let Us Strengthen the Unity of the Communist Movement in the Name of the Triumph of Peace and Socialism" (Editorial), *Pravda*, Jan. 7, 1963. For an analysis of the background and repercussions of the dispute over Albania see Peter S. H. Tang, *The Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Moscow-Tirana-Peking Relations* (Washington, D. C.: Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1962), pp. 1-141.

²¹ C.P.C., Letter, June 14, 1963.

²² C.P.S.U., Open Letter.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ C.P.C., Letter, June 14, 1963.

²⁵ For a study of Peking's influence on Cuba in ideological, political, economic, social, cultural, military, and psychological spheres see Peter S. H. Tang and Joan Maloney, *The Chinese Communist Impact on Cuba* (Chestnut Hill, Mass.: Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1962), pp. 1-125.

²⁶ C.P.S.U., Open Letter.

kind to collaboration with United States imperialism is to lead people astray."²⁷

LACK OF COMMUNIST FRATERNITY

Selfless support and comradely criticism should prevail in tactical as well as strategic considerations in relations between Communist parties and states. Although ends may justify means in dealing with the enemy, the Communist sense of fraternity stresses self-sacrifice within the camp of Marxism-Leninism. A review of Soviet policies toward China during the past three years, however, reveals a number of deviations from this code. Aside from minor favors or lip-service, such as those rendered in the United Nations, the statements and actions of the Soviets toward a major ally seem to have involved distortions and pressures rooted in an assumption of infallibility and hegemony.

Capitalizing on the vague phraseology of the 1957 Moscow Declaration about the importance of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. to the international Communist movement, the Soviets have virtually demanded that all parties accept its program and resolutions. By counterposing the C.P.C. to itself, the C.P.S.U. has employed the tactic of enforcing internal discipline within the Communist world in a patriarchal manner. For example, the foremost offense charged to the Albanian party was its failure to comply with the C.P.S.U. wish that other Marxist-Leninist parties publish certain Soviet documents. Yet the C.P.S.U. itself refused to publish certain important C.P.C. documents, although the Chinese Communists unfailingly had published in full even those Soviet speeches and articles criticizing Peking by name.

When economic pressures were employed against Communist China by unilateral abrogation of mutual agreements by the hundreds, the Soviets insisted that the actual responsibility lay solely with Peking's self-reliant and defiant refusal to honor these agreements. On more than one occasion the Soviets have attempted to become the critic

rather than the criticized by twisting Chinese Communist statements. Thus when the C.P.C. reopened consideration of the responsibility of personality cults the C.P.S.U. termed this the first "open exaltation of the personality cult." When the C.P.C. cautioned against any divisions within the Communist movement along geographic or national lines, the Soviets instantly accused it of inciting racism and implying "yellow peril" threats. In fact, the Soviets have found one of their most convenient tactics to be that of turning all C.P.C. criticism against the Chinese Communists themselves. As the C.P.S.U. Central Committee has been quick to insist: "It is precisely the Chinese comrades who resort to such impermissible action."

THE CONTINUING DILEMMA

Whether judged by conventional standards of conduct or by the code governing relations between Communist states, Soviet policy toward Communist China remains an enigma. In fact, the two leaders of the Communist world face a unique dilemma. Normally they must find new means to ease estrangement or face consequences harmful to the ideology which they are both professedly dedicated to preserve, strengthen and extend. No longer the single master of the international Communist movement, the C.P.S.U. and Soviet leaders have not been able to formulate ideological principles and strategies acceptable to all followers of Marxism-Leninism. Failing to devise such principles, they have, of course, failed to coordinate properly all potential forces for the achievement of the common goal—the international victory of communism. Tactical blunders have even discredited the C.P.S.U. within its own orbit.

As the Chinese Communist challenge has become more articulate, if not more emboldened—now apparent by the June and July open letters of the C.P.C. and C.P.S.U. respectively—the Soviets have conveniently intensified their attacks on "dogmatism." Their cry is for new formulae to meet the conditions of a new epoch. Often using non-ideological approaches to solve ideological problems, the C.P.S.U. seems to be promoting

²⁷ C.P.C., Letter, June 14, 1963.

strategy over ideological principles, and perhaps even tactics over strategy. Thus, the C.P.S.U. demonstrates its seeming inability to satisfy the ideological aspirations of Communists throughout the world, unless it chooses to promote constant internal struggles to intensify Communist dynamics.

"FLEXIBILITY"

In the field of strategy, Soviet policy seems to have suffered a loss of balance in a dialectical approach to its formulations against imperialism, especially with regard to problems of war, peace, peaceful coexistence, the national liberation movement and the transition to socialism. Apparently preoccupied with its immediate and particular task of dealing with the West, especially the United States, the C.P.S.U. has given increasing emphasis to "flexibility" in the name of peaceful coexistence. Yet "flexibility" may be interpreted as weak-willed pragmatism. Thus, on the one hand, the Chinese Communists have come to denounce the Soviets for coercion of fraternal Parties into a rigid imitation of Soviet practices and policies. On the other hand, the C.P.C. sees the danger to the body of Marxist-Leninist doctrine inherent in the practice of a flexible pragmatism, the potential destruction to "basic truths" in the interests of a passing situation. The Soviet justification, if any, for such an "unprincipled compromise" probably could only be found in the advantage of greater freedom of action or greater maneuverability.

Tactically, the Soviets have failed to arrive at a satisfactory working relationship with a chief ally. Unintentionally or willfully, they have given the impression of minimizing the basic Communist duty to distinguish comrades or class brothers from class enemies, to the detriment of the entire concept of proletarian internationalism. Utilizing methods which should be exclusively turned against the enemy, the C.P.S.U. has violated cardinal organizational principles of intra-party and inter-party struggle, and has bypassed the approved processes of criticism and self-criticism to engage in open political fights. Khrushchev's tactics of identifying his own

leadership with the entire Communist movement, and mobilizing satellite leaders to nod to his baton have been denounced by the Chinese Communists. This was a grave enough mistake when committed by Stalin, but even more serious when conducted under the guise of de-Stalinization.

The present state of tension between the leaders of Communist China and the U.S.S.R. may stem from Khrushchev's decision to sacrifice the strengths of the Sino-Soviet partnership upon the altar of traditional Western statecraft. If this should prove to be the case, the decision may prove to be bitterly injurious and an excessive price for some sort of rapprochement with the West.

Current Soviet efforts to conclude a non-aggression agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact alliance, in connection with the negotiation and conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty with the United States and Great Britain, may offer a useful clue. Such statements and measures may symbolize an advance disavowal of the conduct of Communist China within the international Communist movement and may relieve the Soviets substantially of the responsibilities for Peking's adventures. For this reason, present Soviet policy toward Communist China must be read with an eye to its motive, as well as its effect. The Communist-inspired non-Communist facade was of great value in achieving the victories in mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba. Awareness of these lessons and greater vigilance are essential to a better understanding of present Soviet policy.

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"For Russia the German question is 90 per cent of her foreign policy. . . . This specialist observes that "If the United States and Britain seek pacts with the Soviet Union in disregard of German interests, the sequel will be that West Germany will seek a pact with the Soviet Union. . . ." Furthermore, he warns that "if many in the Western democracies might be blind" to this possibility, "the Kremlin is not."

Soviet Soft Line towards the West

BY G. F. HUDSON

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"HATRED OF class enemies is necessary, because it is not possible to become a good fighter for your people or for communism if one does not know how to hate enemies. . . . Yes, comrades, a harsh class struggle is now in progress throughout the world."

It is Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev addressing the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on June 21, 1963. His words need to be read in relation to the official claim that since socialism has been built in Russia and there are no longer any classes based on ownership of private property in the means of production, the Soviet Union is now "a state of the whole people." There cannot, therefore, be any class enemies in the traditional sense within the Soviet borders to-day, although there may be disloyal individuals.

But the disappearance of landlords and capitalists is itself a problem for a ruling Communist party. The Party exists for the purpose of abolishing capitalism, and if capitalism has been abolished, its task is finished—or at least it must find a new one to justify to itself and to those whom it governs the monopoly of power it has acquired. Efforts have been made to prove that the Party's monopoly of power remains indispensable even when there are no longer any class

enemies. Only the Party, it is said, can administer the socialist economy and organize the people for the transition to full communism. But somehow these purely economic and administrative goals fail to evoke the old revolutionary enthusiasm or to rally the people behind the Party in their former submission. Without an enemy the morale of the Party cadres declines and the masses begin to question the Party's right to the permanent and exclusive control of society.

There must, therefore, be enemies, and if they cannot be found at home, they must be found abroad, and hatred against them must be worked up. It is quite easy to find them abroad, since most of the countries of the world are not yet governed by Communist parties, and are thus by definition under the rule of capitalists. A good Communist, as Khrushchev explains in the passage quoted above, must "know how to hate enemies." It is not a question of "spreading communism" as an ideological goal which the leaders of the Party can pursue or not as they feel inclined; they cannot but remain basically hostile to all non-Communist governments because without the long-term revolutionary struggle they would lose their *raison d'être* as a political institution.

Khrushchev, however, is also the protagonist of peaceful coexistence and relaxation of

international tension. There is no reason to doubt that he genuinely wishes to avoid a full-scale war against a power combination of equal or superior strength in an age of nuclear armaments, and since provocative actions and contrived crises can easily result in such a war if the other side is in a resolute frame of mind, it is reasonable to suppose that his behavior will be prudent in international relations whenever he sees a danger of an armed conflict which he cannot expect to win.

HARD LINE POLICY

It has indeed been prudent since the show-down over Cuba a year ago. The Cuba crisis of October, 1962, was the climax of a period of hard Soviet policy which began with the demand for withdrawal of the Western powers from Berlin in November, 1958. Throughout this period, in spite of Khrushchev's gestures of amity during his tour of the United States in 1959, the essence of Soviet policy was pressure on the Western powers to yield on Berlin, with a threat of war (nominally in defence of East-German sovereignty) if they did not. When they had not yielded by the end of 1961, the attempt was made to intensify the blackmail by deploying a part of the Soviet Union's nuclear fire-power in the Western hemisphere.

This failed because the American government reacted with unexpected vigour to the discovery of the secretly installed missiles in Cuba and took decisive steps to eliminate them before they became operational. Khrushchev backed down and withdrew the missiles rather than involve himself in war over them; at the same time he abandoned his intention of concluding a separate peace treaty with East Germany to force the show-down over Berlin for which the build-up in Cuba was a preparation. In his radio speech of October 22, President Kennedy warned Khrushchev that if he took any action against West Berlin he would have to face nuclear war.

It must have been clear to Khrushchev after the Cuba crisis that the hard policy was

not paying any dividends. He was no nearer to getting his way over Berlin than he had been four years before. He had merely repeated Stalin's performance in Germany: Stalin had failed to capture West Berlin by blockade in 1948-1949 and the sequel had been the consolidation of the grouping of the Western powers through the North Atlantic alliance treaty. Now Khrushchev had again failed to win West Berlin; the only result had been to re-unite the Western powers at a time when, owing to the go-it-alone policies of General de Gaulle, their coalition was in danger of disruption. For the time being, at any rate, Soviet policy was completely thwarted, and the failure was personally humiliating for Khrushchev because he had so openly staked his prestige on victory in the diplomatic struggle for Berlin.

Undoubtedly he had hoped for victory with a high measure of confidence; he had expected the United States to be intimidated by Russia's sputniks and intercontinental missiles and even more by rockets in Cuba. But since they had not worked, it was time for a reappraisal, and it need not be an agonizing one. There was already an alternative policy to hand, which had been tentatively followed in the low-tension year of 1955 at the ebb tide of the cold war, when the idea of "disengagement" was in the air. In recent months, the Soviet Union has again been moving towards a relatively soft policy with talk of a non-aggression treaty and of agreed measures for mutual protection against surprise attack in Central Europe. The emphasis has been shifting away from demands for Western withdrawal from Berlin and threats of a separate peace treaty with East Germany towards moves for a relaxation of tension combined with some kind of strategic disengagement.

The test ban treaty¹ has been the initial gesture of the new policy. For those who are seriously concerned with advancing towards a workable system of inspection as a condition for nuclear disarmament a treaty excluding

¹ For the text of this treaty, see pages 235-236 of this issue.

the only tests which could not be detected from outside the Soviet frontiers was a cause more for disappointment than elation. But it has been hailed in the West as a beginning, and has already raised extravagant hopes of a fundamental change in Soviet policy. Certainly the soft approach is better than threats of war. It has also, however, more of a chance to disintegrate Nato.

RECOGNITION OF EAST GERMANY

Apart from West Berlin, the principal objective of Soviet foreign policy is to obtain Western diplomatic recognition of East Germany, or at least such an upgrading of its international status as will in effect cancel the exclusive recognition the Western powers have hitherto given to the Federal Republic. It is not that it matters greatly to the Soviet Union what formal status East Germany has so far as it concerns only East Germany; the political reality of the Communist regime and of the Soviet Union's control over it can be very little affected.

But the Russians certainly appreciate the enormous difference it makes to the attitude of West Germany. For West Germans the question of recognition of Russia's satellite German government is crucial. They are well aware that the facts of military power in Europe render it impossible for the Western powers to impose the reunification of Germany through free elections which is their proclaimed objective. But for that very reason they attach all the more importance to the refusal of their allies to recognize the Ulbricht regime. If it is once accorded a *de jure* international status, then the division of Germany into two separate states is legitimized, and the dismemberment of Germany by Russia has become part of the public law of Europe.

Unfortunately, however, a rigid refusal to concede diplomatic recognition to East Germany (or such practical forms of recognition as would inevitably lead to full acceptance) appears to be incompatible with agreements for reducing tension in Central Europe to which East Germany would have to be a

party. Such agreements are likely to become increasingly attractive to the Western powers, or at least to the United States and Britain in a period of soft Soviet policy, and thus to give rise to increasing friction with Bonn.

The test ban treaty has already revealed the dilemma of Western policy on which the Soviet government may be expected to concentrate its diplomatic effort in the months ahead. The United States and Britain in negotiating the treaty with the Soviet Union did not consult West Germany about its form, and seem to have quite forgotten the implications of a general treaty which both West and East Germany would be invited to sign.

Only after the treaty was concluded did the American and British government heed West German protests at this aspect of the test ban treaty and find a way round the difficulty by ensuring that the signatures of the two German governments would not appear on the same document. United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk went to Bonn especially to assure the West German government that no recognition of East Germany was intended. But the episode was ominous; on the one hand it aroused West German suspicions of the good faith of the American and British governments, while on the other it produced signs of impatience and resentment in America and Britain at what seemed an unreasonable obstruction of a most desirable East-West agreement.

Commenting on the situation, *The Times* (London) observed in an editorial of August 22:

Fundamentally the trouble was an expression of West Germany's chronic fear that her interests are being ignored by her allies in their search for an accommodation with Russia. . . . Affecting everyone is the inescapable dilemma that the only road to relaxation which the Russians are ready to open appears to be through recognition of East Germany. West Germany is constantly worried that her allies will fall for the temptation.

A POTENT CHARM

There are indeed good grounds for this worry. If Khrushchev can desist for a period

of time from threatening war, menacing West Berlin, or assisting anti-American revolutionaries in the Western hemisphere, the pressure of public opinion for negotiation on measures of disengagement in Europe is likely to become very strong in America. In Britain it will be even stronger. The concepts of a non-aggression treaty between Nato and the Warsaw Pact powers and of precautions against surprise attack by stationing observers to the east and west of the "front line" in Europe (a favourite notion of Dean Rusk's) would soon come to have a potent charm for peoples longing for an end of the cold war and deliverance from the fear of nuclear massacre.

The objections of West Germany in these beneficial undertakings would then appear to be mere legalistic quibbling, and even if some American and British diplomats were aware of the dangers of such a course, the popular pressure on the American and British governments to override West German objections might well prove decisive. Yet the consequences of such policies can be foreseen, and if many in the Western democracies might be blind to them, the Kremlin is not. If the United States and Britain seek pacts with the Soviet Union in disregard of German interests, the sequel will be that West Germany will seek a pact with the Soviet Union in disregard of the United States and Britain.

West Germany's alignment with the West and membership in Nato are not inevitable, to be taken for granted as in the nature of things; this pro-Western policy is the outcome of German resistance to the imposition of Communist rule in Germany combined with a conviction that the Western powers are unalterably opposed to the forcible division of Germany imposed by Russia. If Germans generally were to feel that they had been let down by the West while a more flexible Soviet policy were to make the menace of Communist rule less imminent (even discarding East German leader Walter Ulbricht), a shift of West Germany from the Western to the Soviet orbit would not be

unthinkable. It would find advocates on the Right as well as on the Left of German politics, and if impossible under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, it would be possible under Ludwig Erhard, particularly if the Soviet Union were to offer rights of access to Com-econ markets as an additional inducement.

The main inducement would of course be a reunification of Germany through the confederation of the two German states; the price would be withdrawal from Nato and subordination of Germany as a whole to a Soviet-dominated European order. Nominally Germany would be neutralized, but the conditions of the balance of power in Europe are such that Germany could not really be neutral. East Germany would remain as closely tied to Russia as it is now—since it is the most artificial and externally imposed of all the East European satellite regimes—but as an equal partner in a confederation it would tend to prevail over a democratic government in West Germany.

Moreover, while East Germany would still be under effective Russian military protection, a secession of West Germany from Nato would almost certainly lead to a complete American military withdrawal from Europe, so that West Germany would be unprotected against Russia. And although it might be allowed for the time being to remain capitalist in its economy, it would have to accept an over-all Russian political leadership.

In such circumstances it would be doubtful whether France would long maintain a stand against Russian preponderance on the continent of Europe. Russian dominance would mark the end of General Charles de Gaulle's policy of a Common Market Europe and of a close Franco-German political partnership. The secret of de Gaulle's remarkable hold on Germany—which has been too little understood in Washington and London—has been his uncompromising support for the West German position on Berlin in contrast to the Anglo-American zeal for exploring all avenues and leaving no stone unturned in trying to reach an agreement with Russia.

Bonn has been convinced that France under de Gaulle is a firmer friend diplomatically than the United States or Britain; on the other hand, the West Germans know that American nuclear power is the only real deterrent to Russia and are far too realistic to get themselves into a situation in which they would be dependent for their defence only on the French *force de frappe*. If, therefore, they were to come to the conclusion that they were being let down by the United States and Britain for the sake of accommodation with Russia, they would be ready to renounce the French alliance as well as the wider Nato coalition in order to make their own terms with Russia.

France would then have to abandon her present Gaullist ambitions and de Gaulle himself would probably be discredited politically. France would in effect be back behind the Maginot Line—though it no longer exists as a military barrier—and might seek a new form of alliance with the United States and Britain in an effort to preserve her independence. She might alternatively take refuge in neutralism, with a temporary collaboration between the Communists and the *mendesiste* element in French domestic politics.

For Russia the German question is 90 per cent of her foreign policy, and this is nothing new. Viewing Europe from Moscow, Germany is in the foreground of the picture and her alignment is the key to the affairs of the continent. The hope of winning over Germany, fear of Germany, alliance with Germany, war with Germany—through all the phases of Soviet foreign policy since the October revolution Germany has been of primary importance. Although the Soviet Union also has interests and ambitions in Asia—and even in Africa and Latin America—there has never been a real diversion of Soviet political priorities from Europe. The Soviet Union remains primarily a European power, and Moscow's thinking on foreign policy moves most naturally along the axial line, Moscow-Warsaw-Berlin-Paris.

In the approach to Europe, state diplomacy and international Communist "fraternal" po-

litics are today in practice no less closely linked than they were in the days of the Comintern. Moscow certainly does not forget—although many political observers in the West now do—that the most important Communist parties of the world outside the zone of Communist-governed states are still those of France and Italy. Since the immediate post-war period they have had no prospect of an early acquisition of power. Fear of Soviet domination and of violent revolution has been combined with the stabilizing effect of the American counter-intervention in Europe to rally major political forces in Western Europe on an anti-Communist basis. This has rendered impossible not only violent seizures of power, but also a repetition of the Popular Front policies of the 1930's.

But the situation could change rapidly if there were to be a dissolution of Nato through the dissensions of its members while at the same time a new and less alarming image of communism was successfully projected in Western Europe. Both developments are implied in the Soviet soft policy: the Soviet diplomacy aimed at driving a wedge between West Germany and the other Western nations runs parallel with a vigorous new propaganda effort to present Communist parties as having renounced revolutionary violence in favour of peaceful and constitutional action, thus rendering themselves eligible for coalitions with left-of-centre democratic parliamentary parties. This is of course one of the issues of contention with the Chinese Communists, who claim that the revolutionary heritage of Leninism is being betrayed. In fact nothing could more clearly illustrate the fact that the Russians are primarily concerned with Europe rather than with Asia or Africa: the

(Continued on page 243)

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

On July 25, 1963, meeting in Spiridonovska Palace in Moscow, U.S. Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and British Minister for Science Viscount Hailsham initialed a treaty banning all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Underground tests are not included. The treaty must be ratified by the three governments. On August 5, 1963, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk, British Foreign Secretary Lord Home, and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko signed the test ban pact. By August 18, 68 other nations had acceded to the treaty. The texts of the communiqué issued by the three delegates and the treaty are reprinted in full:

COMMUNIQUE

The special representatives of the President of the United States of America and of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs of the United States, and Lord Hailsham, Lord President of the Council and Minister of Science for the United Kingdom, visited Moscow together with their advisers on July 14. Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham were received by the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, N. S. Khrushchev, who presided on July 15 at the first of a series of meetings to discuss questions relating to the discontinuance of nuclear tests, and other questions of mutual interest. The discussions were continued from July 16 to July 25 with A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. During these discussions each principal was assisted by his advisers.

The discussions took place in a businesslike, cordial atmosphere. Agreement was reached on the text of a treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This text is being published separately and simultaneously with this com-

munique. It was initialed on July 25 by A. A. Gromyko, Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham. Mr. Harriman and Lord Hailsham together with their advisers will leave Moscow shortly to report and bring back the initialed texts to their respective Governments. Signature of the treaty is expected to take place in the near future in Moscow.

The heads of the three delegations agreed that the test ban treaty constituted an important first step toward the reduction of international tension and the strengthening of peace, and they look forward to further progress in this direction.

The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of nonaggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants. A brief exchange of views also took place with regard to other measures directed at a relaxation of tension.

TREATY

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water

Preamble

The governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the "original parties,"

Proclaiming as their principal aim the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control in accordance with the objectives of the United Nations, which would put an end to the armaments race and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons,

Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

A. In the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

B. In any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. It is understood in this connection that the provisions of this subparagraph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusions of which, as the parties have stated in the

preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve.

2. Each of the parties to this Treaty undertakes furthermore to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in, the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to in Paragraph 1 of this article.

Article II

1. Any party may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depositary governments which shall circulate it to all parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the parties, the depositary governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the parties, to consider such amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all parties to this Treaty, including the votes of all of the original parties. The amendment shall enter into force for all parties upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the parties, including the instruments of ratification of all of the original parties.

Article III

1. This Treaty shall be open to all states for signature. Any state which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with Paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the governments of the original Parties—the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—which are hereby designated the depositary governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all the original Parties and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

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BOOK REVIEWS

NEW BOOKS ON THE U.S.S.R.

THE SOVIET HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II: MYTHS, MEMORIES, AND REALITIES. BY MATTHEW P. GALLAGHER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. 205 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

Matthew P. Gallagher has performed a valuable service in presenting the Soviet history of World War II, with all its distortions, falsehoods, and cynically manipulated analyses. Gallagher's study "is concerned primarily with the psychological and emotional conflicts generated within Soviet society by the mendacious account of the war given out in Soviet postwar propaganda. It is concerned secondarily with the official interpretations themselves, not for what they tell of the history of Soviet propaganda but for what they tell of the political and military history of the contemporary Soviet period."

Gallagher has focused attention on the writings of three professional groups "whose interests were most directly affected by official attitudes toward the war and whose views are revealed to the attentive reader of Soviet publications: the professional military, the historians, and the writers." During the Stalin period, distortions of what had actually happened were imposed upon all groups, irrespective of the consequences, in order to strengthen the myth of Stalin's invincibility. The post-Stalin leaders, for a variety of reasons, including "a revised estimate of the likelihood and consequences of surprise attack in a future war," have encouraged reinterpretations in order to permit necessary advances to be made in military thinking and, at the same time, to reinvigorate the reputation of the Party.

In concluding that "there was a resistance to the official line on the war during

the postwar period that was consciously motivated," and was recognized as such "both by the regime and by those who voiced it," Gallagher sees glimmers of hope for the persistence of individual values and conscience in the Soviet Union, and for their altering, in time, the character of the Soviet system. This is a major and absorbing work of scholarship. It is written with impressive clarity, effectiveness, and feeling for the difficulties of being a thinking individual in a closed society. A.Z.R.

ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE SOVIET UNION. EDITED BY ABRAM BERGSON AND SIMON KUZNETS. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 392 pages and index, \$9.75.)

The subject of Soviet economic growth has attracted increasing attention in recent years. Although the contributors to this excellent volume generally do not venture beyond 1958 or 1959, they present a fresh, integrated look at such important areas as national income (Abram Bergson), labor force (Warren W. Eason), industrial production (Raymond P. Powell), *et al.* This is assuredly not a book for the layman. It is rather a scholarly, detailed, comprehensive presentation of the extent of our knowledge about different aspects of Soviet economic growth. As such, any specialist and student of Soviet affairs will want to refer to this valuable study.

A.Z.R.

THE THEORY, LAW, AND POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES. BY JAN F. TRISKA AND ROBERT M. SLUSSER. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962. 593 pages, appendix, bibliography, and index, \$10.00.)

As the authors of this massive study note in their preface, "seldom have international

contractual and legal relations aroused so much sustained concern throughout the world as have Soviet treaties, agreements, and conventions." This book complements an earlier volume which identified the treaties and international agreements concluded by the U.S.S.R. during the 1917-1957 period; it is "essentially an attempt to extract and analyze the salient features and the more enduring tendencies, conditions, and trends which help to explain the making of Soviet treaty theory, law, and policy; to identify their basic common denominators; and to apply the resulting pattern to an over-all long-term analysis of Soviet international agreements."

This volume will prove an indispensable tool for any specialist in Soviet affairs or international law. It reflects diligent, painstaking research, an impressive mastery of material, and a commendable capacity for effective organization and lucid analysis. The more than 100 pages of notes and sources testify to scholarly comprehensiveness. The bibliography is complete and will be invaluable to advanced students.

The authors draw a number of conclusions that have enormous political implications. For example, they note that "Soviet specialists in international law have repeatedly emphasized their adherence to principles that command general support: for example, national equality, respect for national sovereignty, non-aggression, non-intervention, and territorial integrity. Is it not legitimate to hope that this imposing array of principles will some day, if not now, constitute a wholesome influence on Soviet treaty practice and gradually lead the Soviet Union to adopt a policy of live and let live in a world of peace and justice? Regrettably we must state our conclusion that the doctrine of Soviet international law cannot now exert such an influence, nor does it seem likely to in the foreseeable future. The Soviet discipline of international law performs a subservient and supporting function in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, and there is no

reason to think that it will soon acquire a more influential position." They also note that "it was only during the period when Soviet Russia lagged behind the West in military and industrial strength, roughly up to 1939, that the Soviet leaders and the spokesmen of her foreign policy talked in terms of a Soviet foreign policy based on the concept of Russia as a national state constituting a member of the international community of states. Since 1939 they have made no effort to hide their conviction that the Communist system will eventually be spread to the entire world."

A.Z.R.

A. MODERN HISTORY OF SOVIET GEORGIA. BY D. M. LANG. (New York: Grove Press, 1962. 298 pages and index, \$6.50.)

D. M. Lang, a British specialist on Caucasian and Soviet affairs, notes that "The Soviet Union, like the Russian empire before it, is a multiracial, multinational and multilingual confederation of peoples of diverse ethnic origins, many of whom have no direct affinity with the Russians and other Slavonic peoples." Soviet Georgia is assured of a front-stage role in modern history because it was the birthplace of Joseph Stalin. But there are perhaps other more significant reasons why Soviet Georgia is deserving of the careful and extensive treatment accorded to it in this excellent study.

Nationalism is strong among many of the minority peoples in the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders are continually confronted with the pressure to bend all groups to a sought-after homogenized "new Soviet man" and the necessity of permitting minority groups to retain their distinctive national identity.

Of the thirteen chapters in the book, eight are devoted to a history of the area prior to 1917. There are chapters dealing with the developments in Georgia (and the Caucasus region) during the period of "War Communism," the short-lived

Georgian republic, the reincorporation into the Russian imperial system, the Stalin period, and the mood and temper of Georgia today.

The author notes that though the Georgians have suffered at times at the hand of Moscow, they have made considerable economic and social progress, and "when one contrasts the dynamic economic and industrial system of Georgia with the chronic instability of some modern countries of the Middle East, or with the deplorable stagnation and effeteness of others, there is no denying the positive side of Russia's work in Georgia." A.Z.R.

HOW RUSSIA IS RULED. BY MERLE FAINSD. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. 684 pages, supplementary readings, notes, index, \$8.95. Revised edition.)

All those concerned with the study and teaching of Soviet government will welcome the publication of Professor Merle Fainsod's masterful volume on *How Russia is Ruled*. This revised edition, retaining the same organization as the earlier edition, "incorporates the important changes of the post-Stalinist era. Since these changes have affected virtually every aspect of Soviet life, they are reflected in every part of the book except the introductory historical chapters." A decade after its initial publication, this is the most authoritative single volume on the Soviet system of government. A.Z.R.

INSIDE A SOVIET EMBASSY: Experiences of a Russian Diplomat in Burma. BY ALEKSANDR KAZNACHEEV. (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1962. 250 pages, \$4.95.)

In June, 1959, a young Soviet diplomat in Burma went quietly to the American Embassy in Rangoon, admitted his disillusionment with communism, and requested sanctuary. Some three years later, Aleksandr Kaznacheev has written the story of his career in the Soviet foreign

service, his growing disillusionment, and his subsequent decision to seek a new life in the non-Communist world.

Written simply, in tasteful conversational form, the account is an engrossing combination of revelation and drama. For the first time, we are presented with a detailed picture of the inner workings of a Soviet embassy, with its intrigues, suspicions, and division of labor. Intelligence operations and their organization are shown in their relationship to the conduct of more traditional functions of diplomacy. Kaznacheev gives an analysis of Sino-Soviet strategy in South Asia, of the hidden Sino-Soviet struggle in Burma. His description of his life and education in the Soviet Union is valuable, particularly as it relates to recruitment practices and training for a diplomatic post. His growing attachment for the Burmese, their culture, family life, and religion is told with restraint and dignity.

This book will no doubt attract widespread attention in the West. Aside from its obvious usefulness as a political document, it is of great interest as the story of the discovery of the meaning and value of human dignity and loyalty. As Kaznacheev makes clear, the Soviet purpose in Burma is to subvert that country and place it under Communist rule. A.Z.R.

RUSSIAN CLASSICS IN SOVIET JACKETS. BY MAURICE FRIEDBERG. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1962. 228 pages and index, \$4.75.)

Literacy, education and the availability of books have assumed important dimensions in the progress of Soviet man. Tracing twentieth century reading habits in the Soviet Union, Friedberg finds that not only the sophisticated reader is attracted to prerevolutionary literature. The majority of young adults who have been dosed with dull, boring Soviet creations during their school years tend to look for more pleasurable reading in the masterpieces of Russia's great writers of the nineteenth cen-

ture. Thus, under the aegis of the Soviet publishing industry, the Russian classics continue to roll off the presses. But it would be wrong to be misled into thinking that the laws of supply and demand prevail. The intricacies of relating the development of Soviet thought and ideology to the production of books and the consequent formation of reading habits are the author's preoccupation.

The quantitative data collected from primary sources are included in 23 tables in the various appendices. The author's knowledge of Russian literature is obvious in his analysis of his findings. He devotes attention to the publication of single works as well as multivolume editions—both complete and selected—and does not hesitate to point out reason for excluding certain works. Changes in publication plans are not overlooked. To prevent an over-optimistic appraisal of the situation, the unanswered questions posed in the final pages of this book are worthy of careful thought.

Although beyond the scope of the basic problem, the author must have formulated some conclusions on the apparent increase in the publication of the pre-revolutionary classics in English translation by the Soviets. A word on the selection of authors and titles for sale by the Foreign Languages Publishing House would not detract from the study of Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets.

ANNA PIRSCENOK
University of Pennsylvania

HISTORY AND POLITICS

ACTION FRANÇAISE. ROYALISM AND REACTION IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRANCE. By EUGEN WEBER. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962. xi, 594 pages, maps, index, \$10.00.)

When at the turn of the century perceptive young conservatives all over Europe felt the gentle shocks of the crumbling of

the old order, they began seeking new ideological paths to the eternal verities. By the 1920's and 1930's these new paths seemed to converge on various brands of fascism, fellow-travelling thereto, or impotent protestations that a wrong turning had been followed. The new Right in Germany and Austria has already received attention from talented and engaged scholars. Only in the last few years has similar careful attention been given neo-conservatism in France. By far the best work to appear on the most vocal, influential, and perhaps bizarre of French neo-conservative groupings is Professor Weber's book on the Action Française.

The author has given us a carefully documented and engagingly written account of Charles Maurras and his collaborators in the movement from its origins in 1899, as a result of the Dreyfus affair, to its demise with the liberation of France. Starting as a condemnation of *fin de siècle* France primarily on aesthetic and moral grounds, the Action Française soon turned to anti-parliamentary politics, to apolitical politics. The goal was to fashion an authoritarian, hierarchical, monarchist, and Catholic nation, a new-old *douce France*, which would resist the aggression of Republicanism, Free-Masonry, socialism, and Jewry from within France, and the German arch-fiends from without.

Professor Weber offers an excellent description and interpretation of the developments which brought about the condemnation of the movement by the Papacy, its repudiation by the Pretender, its political ineptness, and finally, its toleration of collaboration with the Germans during the Occupation. The author points up the central thrust of the movement's ideology, the desire for the continuity of authority—be it a king or a Marshal Pétain. Since the French have not yet solved this problem, the kind of thinking which created the Action Française is surely not dead.

HERMAN LEBOVICS
Brooklyn College

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SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM

(Continued from page 204)

scope and nature of the cold war power assets of both East and West. It is evident, however, that space warfare capabilities will assume an ever-increasing role in strategic calculations during this decade. It would appear that the conquest of space has become a primary route that the U.S.S.R. will follow in an effort to reinvigorate both the image and reality of its power in the cold war.

Space already may have been selected as the key medium in which the Soviets hope to attain military superiority over the West. A pronounced affirmation of the goal of military superiority by top Soviet military leaders occurred in 1962 and was concurrent with the new emphasis on the military uses of space.

Perhaps with the space program in mind, Marshal Malinovsky said that "New scientific ideas and technical inventions, as a rule, are evaluated not only from the standpoint of their general importance, but also from the standpoint of the prospects for military use." Close analysis of this document reveals that the stated goal does not represent special pleading by the military sector but has been politically determined by top Soviet leadership. Subsequent articles by Marshal Greshko in *Izvestia* and by a Colonel Ratnikov in *Red Star* reiterated the theme of military superiority. Marshal Greshko openly stated that the Communist party and the Soviet government "are basing their military policy" on the superiority of the armed forces of "the soundest commonwealth" over those of the West.

Mention of "the soundest commonwealth" may be the harbinger of an effort to reaffirm the paramountcy of the Soviet Union within the Communist bloc, based on superior military technology. To the Russians, the polycentrism of the Communist world movement, unlike the polycentrism of the universe, is not governed by immutable, natural laws. The Sino-Soviet controversy, especially, could

provide an additional stimulus to Soviet planners to attain clear superiority in new weapons fields.

The prospect that the Soviets already may have decided to seek military superiority over the West in space warfare places a special responsibility for vigilance on the United States. As recently stated by General William F. McKee, Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force: "... we must watch our own and the Soviets' space programs carefully. This is probably the area of greatest demand on our vision as a nation. For it is here that one of us, probably, will find the key to the strategic superiority of the 1970's."

CHANGE AND STABILITY

(Continued from page 208)

Khrushchev at a closed session of the twentieth party congress in February, 1956. The official text of Khrushchev's speech was not released but its general contents were officially confirmed and Khrushchev has repeatedly returned to this theme. He did not entirely repudiate Stalin but rather denounced the excesses of his rule. As a consequence, Stalin's embalmed body was removed from the mausoleum in the Red Square and, what is far more important, a novel element of discord was introduced in the relations between the Communist parties. Khrushchev's doctrine of peaceful coexistence contributed to friction between the Soviets, on the one hand, and China and Albania, on the other. The resulting situation is examined in other articles in this issue. The principal consequence of Khrushchev's revision of the Communist doctrine is the fissure—the importance of which cannot be fathomed at this time—in the world Communist movement.

V

Stalin's death raised the promise of the relaxation of the regime of socialist realism in which Russian literature and the arts have lingered for a quarter of a century. These ex-

pectations, which were widely shared abroad, envisaged a more lenient attitude towards arts and letters and became associated with Ilya Ehrenburg's novel, *The Thaw*. There was a period when Khrushchev and other Communist leaders appeared to be hesitant about the course to follow, but Communist orthodoxy and socialist realism which, for practical purposes, may be defined as glorification of the Soviet regime, soon re-asserted themselves. The melancholy case of Boris Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* was an important landmark on the road leading to the tightening of Communist controls over art and literature.

In the spring of 1963, Khrushchev included *The Thaw* among the books which gave "an incorrect, one-sided interpretation of the events and developments connected with the cult of the individual." He and the Communist party unwaveringly rejected ideological coexistence. In June, 1963, Victor P. Nekrasov, a Soviet novelist and Stalin prize winner in 1947, was expelled from the party for "bourgeois objectivism" in reporting his impressions of life in the United States.

If literature, the arts, and social sciences fare poorly in post-Stalin Russia, great advances have been scored in the sciences, especially in space studies, a subject discussed in another article in this issue.

The survey of Soviet developments since 1953 raises more questions than it answers. Most of the developments do not affect the essentials of the Soviet regime. The police regime, although reportedly mitigated, is still in force. In spite of the official repudiation of the cult of personality, the glorification of Lenin is a part of every-day routine, Nikita Sergeevich is invariably applauded and no one in Russia has as much as intimated in public that he might be wrong. The practical implications of the doctrine of coexistence should not be minimized, yet the inevitability of the downfall of capitalism and of the triumph of world communism is fully upheld. The familiar adage, *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*, would seem to hold good.

RED DRIVE IN CUBA

(Continued from page 222)

ment to the entire hemisphere through the Alliance for Progress. There is some evidence that this burden is being felt, especially in bloc countries like Czechoslovakia which has assumed a major portion of the load. But the strategic gains are apparently regarded as worth the price.

Within Cuba there is great dissatisfaction and a considerable amount of sabotage. Monitoring of the internal radio net by public and private groups in the United States has clearly indicated that the Cuban people are collectively dragging their feet in the face of repeated exhortations to produce for the socialist economy. Sugar, the vital cash crop, presently brings a high price in the world market, but Cuba is in a poor position to take advantage of it. Production has fallen from 6.7 million tons in 1961 to less than 4 million tons during 1962.

There is no likelihood that the 1963 crop will be higher, because sabotage and slow-down continue to be significant factors. The great potential penalty which the Soviets may suffer in Cuba is the possibility of losing the island as a result of adequate United States counter intervention. Such a happening would bring the first major rollback for the Communists in the cold war and might unmask their pose as the inevitable wave of the future. Unfortunately this eventuality seems remote in mid-1963. Events since the October crisis suggest that the United States is pursuing the line of coexistence with communism in the Western Hemisphere.¹⁸

When the Communist leader of Guatemala, Carlos Manuel Pellecer, broke with the Party in November, 1962, he wrote a series of damaging articles explaining his defection. Ultimately his decision to leave stemmed from his realization that "irresponsibility, treach-

¹⁸ An excellent discussion of the current United States stance can be found in Charles Burton Marshall, "The Smile of Safety: What Are We Being Told About Cuba?" *New Republic*, May 25, 1963, pp. 17-18.

ery, public immorality and deceit are inborn in communism."¹⁹ The Soviet record in Cuba is entirely consistent with Pellecer's conclusion.

Initially, Communist support was extended to Castro on a careful experimental basis. Extensive aid came after Castro gained all internal instruments of power. The United States failure at the Bay of Pigs opened new vistas, and the missile gamble pointed to a high pay-off with little risk. The Soviets apparently regard their present position in Cuba as secure and worth heavy investment. The island provides a base for further Communist expansion. The continued Soviet presence demonstrates the unwillingness of the United States to take concrete action in order to affirm its declared policy of a free Cuba in a non-Communist hemisphere.

¹⁹ As quoted in *America*, February 9, 1963, p. 196.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

(Continued from page 236)

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding states of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force, and the date of receipt of any requests for conferences or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the depositary governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article IV

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of

such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty three months in advance.

Article V

This Treaty, of which the English and Russian texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the depositary governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the depositary governments to the governments of the signatory and acceding states.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in triplicate at Moscow, this 25th day of July, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-three.

SOVIET SOFT LINE

(Continued from page 234)

Chinese rightly see opportunities for their favourite methods of guerilla insurrection in underdeveloped countries, but the Russians do not see Communists winning power in Paris or Rome by tactics that work in Vietnam.

The Communist parties of Western Europe have rallied round Khrushchev in his ideological fight with the Chinese, and their willingness to accept directions from Moscow is as great as it ever was. They remain essentially fifth columns in the service of a country not their own; but in proportion as Soviet foreign policy becomes softer they will be in a position to gain more popular credence for their advocacy of "peace." They could greatly increase the scope of their political activity if Nato once began to crumble. If West Germany were to come to terms with Russia, there would be plenty of non-Communist politicians in France and Italy ready to take the same path, and Communist parties no longer regarded as outside the pale of political democracy could make political alliances with them.

Soviet policy, having failed to make gains by direct intimidation and threats, now appears to be following a course which might dissolve Nato by diminishing fear of the Soviet Union in Western Europe and induc-

ing the United States and Britain to seek agreements with Moscow at the expense of Germany. Two developments, however, might render this new course ineffective.

One would be a premature Soviet return to violent or menacing acts which would spoil the effect of the propaganda of good will. It is temperamentally difficult for Khrushchev to refrain from aggressive behaviour for very long, and a soft Soviet policy, however promising for the future, would require great patience, especially when it would have to be carried out under a constant fire of derisive criticism from Peking. It might, moreover, be upset by events not planned or foreseen by the Kremlin. Just as destalinization in 1956 was followed by the unexpected upheavals in Poland and Hungary, so a new period of relaxation and wooing of the non-Communist Left might lead to fresh disturbances in East Central Europe which would drive the Soviet Union back into measures of repression and diplomatic intransigence.

The other kind of political development which might frustrate a soft Soviet policy for the disintegration of Nato would be an increased realization in Britain and the United States of the dangers of playing with superficially attractive projects for observation posts against surprise attack and other such items of international gadgetry which are put forward as desirable sequels to the test ban treaty. None of these projects is likely to be of any substantial value in a real war emergency, but they will all involve the participation of East Germany in one way or another, and this is what is likely to make them interesting to Russia.

The paramount interest of Soviet policy is to induce the United States and Britain to double-cross West Germany. They need not, however, fall into the traps laid for them, provided the leaders can rid themselves of the idea that it is always in all circumstances better to seek agreements than to leave things as they are. The present situation in Germany is outrageous, but the least dangerous, thing to do about it is not to do anything. Containment is still the best of policies in confrontation with Communist Rus-

sia; in Germany it means simply a "Stimson Doctrine" of not recognizing what the Russians have done there. The contest will be won in the end by the side which is the less impatient.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 240)

PAKISTAN: THE CONSOLIDATION OF A NATION. By WAYNE AYRES WILCOX. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963. 276 pages, appendix, index, and bibliography, \$6.00.)

The author of this fine study notes that Pakistan, despite its size and importance, "has remained in the shadow of India since 1947, attracting attention only occasionally by its unstable cabinets, unique communal ideology, curiously split territories, or many quarrels with India." To help redress this imbalance, and to fill a need for an adequate political history of Pakistan, the author explores "the molding of Pakistan and focuses on the sometimes tortuous efforts of its leaders to introduce effective, uniform, and democratic government to a people who, until 1947, lived under petty princes and tribal chiefs."

This well-written, interesting study provides a much-needed presentation of the political evolution of our ally, Pakistan. A scholarly, serious study, it reads easily and informs clearly. A.Z.R.

THE PERMANENT CRISIS. By KURT LONDON. (New York: Walker and Company, 1962. 328 pages and index, \$6.00.)

Professor Kurt London, Director of the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies at George Washington University, has written a stimulating, often provocative book "on the far-reaching changes in the character and substance of world politics." He notes that the bipolarization of world power, the mushrooming of nuclear weaponry and the widening ideological schism in the world have combined to produce a new structure and pattern for international politics to which the West has yet to adapt. His analysis of contemporary problems is cogent, clear and perceptive. A.Z.R.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of August, 1963, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

African Development Bank

Aug. 5—At the end of a 5 day meeting in Khartoum, delegates from 32 African states sign an agreement setting up an African Development Bank with a capitalization of \$250 million; the agreement will be open for signature until December 31, 1963. The Economic Commission for Africa has been working on this project for two years.

Aug. 7—The U.A.R. commits itself to the purchase of \$30 million in shares for the capitalization of the African Development Bank.

Berlin

Aug. 13—At the Friedrichstrasse crossing into East Berlin from West Berlin, West Berlin youths stage a demonstration against the Berlin wall on the second anniversary of its erection.

Disarmament

Aug. 5—The test ban treaty is signed in Moscow by the British, U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers. (For the text of this treaty see pages 235-236 of this issue.)

Aug. 8—Thirty-one additional nations sign the test ban treaty in Washington. The treaty is open for signature simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington.

Aug. 19—West Germany signs the partial test ban treaty in Washington.

Aug. 30—The Washington-Moscow "hot line," the direct communications link to lessen the danger of accidental nuclear war, becomes operational.

Organization of African Unity

Aug. 9—Guinean delegate to the U.N. Diallo

Telli is chosen Secretary of the New Organization of African States by a conference commission. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, becomes permanent headquarters of the organization.

Aug. 11—The Dakar conference of 32 ministers of the Organization of African Unity refuses to accept the nomination of Diallo Telli; the conference ends with the "wish" that African regional groupings will "melt gradually."

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

Aug. 8—Haiti asks the O.A.S. to try to arrange the removal from the Dominican Republic of leaders exiled from Haiti because these rebels pose "a threat to Haiti's peace and security."

Aug. 19—Haiti asks urgent action by the O.A.S. because of "direct and indirect aggression" against her from the Dominican Republic. (See also *Haiti*.)

United Nations

(See also *British Empire, Malaysia*)

Aug. 2—In a meeting of the Security Council called at the request of 32 African nations who termed South Africa's racist policies a threat to the peace, U.S. delegate Adlai Stevenson says the U.S. will stop selling military equipment to South Africa by January 1, 1964, pending an end to its segregation policies. But the U.S. delegate opposes active sanctions as "bad law and bad policy."

Aug. 5—The U.N. armistice commission condemns Israeli violation of the U.A.R.'s air space on July 23. The commission is boycotted by Israel.

Aug. 7—The Security Council votes 9-0 to

ask all U.N. members to ban military equipment shipments to South Africa until that state ends its racist policies.

Aug. 23—The Security Council meets to discuss the Syrian-Israeli border crisis. (See also *Israel*.)

Aug. 29—The U.S. and Britain ask the Security Council to condemn the "wanton murder" of 2 Israeli farmers by Syrians.

ALGERIA

Aug. 13—Sources report that the President of the Algerian parliament, Ferhat Abbas, has decided to resign.

Aug. 16—A member of the Political Bureau of the National Liberation Front (Algeria's only party) announces that the Bureau has voted to exclude Abbas from all association with the Front.

Aug. 24—In the parliament, debate opens on the new constitution proposed by Premier Ahmed Ben Bella.

Aug. 28—The National Assembly approves the new constitution which gives strong powers to Algeria's only party, the National Liberation Front. The Front will pick the president and parliament; they will later be voted on by the people.

BOLIVIA

Aug. 9—Some 7,000 tin miners strike in the Catavi mining region to protest the plan to reorganize this government-owned industry and to eliminate unnecessary jobs.

Aug. 15—A general strike is called by the Bolivian Miners Federation.

Aug. 21—The Bolivian cabinet resigns over the tin mine crisis.

Aug. 22—President Victor Paz Estenssoro reorganizes the Cabinet.

Aug. 28—It is reported that the National Miners Federation has agreed to end the tin strike. Yesterday, strikers at 2 large mines voluntarily returned to their jobs.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

Australia

Aug. 13—Federal Treasurer Harold E. Holt tells the House of Representatives in Can-

berra that the 1963-1964 budget calls for a deficit of £58 million (\$130 million).

Canada

Aug. 2—Minister of Trade and Commerce Mitchell Sharp reveals a trade agreement calling for delivery of from 112 to 187 million bushels of Canadian wheat to Communist China over a 3-year period. This agreement follows the agreement negotiated in 1961 which expired at the end of 1962; the new agreement gives the Chinese a longer term of payment.

Ceylon

Aug. 2—Lands Minister Charles de Silva announces that the Government is planning to take 2 per cent of the entire acreage planted in tea and distribute a fourth of an acre to every landless peasant in tea growing areas. The Government, which will also give each peasant 1,000 rupees (\$200) to build a cottage, has accepted this plan on the recommendation of the Parliamentary Advisory Committee.

Aug. 12—A mass rally in Colombo formally announces the formation of the United Left Front (Marxist) composed of the Communist party, the Trotskyist party and the People's United Front.

Aug. 22—The U.S.S.R. and Ceylon sign an agreement under which the U.S.S.R. will purchase 7,000 tons of sheet rubber from Ceylon.

Great Britain

Aug. 6—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan arrives in Helsinki, Finland, for a 4-day visit.

Aug. 8—A masked gang of robbers steals more than \$7 million dollars from a special mail train in Britain's greatest train robbery.

Aug. 16—In Stratford on Avon, the Conservatives hold the seat vacated by the resignation of former Secretary of State for War John Profumo.

Aug. 19—Some 150,000 British construction workers begin the first national strike in the British building industry since 1926.

Aug. 23—The Government reveals that it warned the U.S.S.R. in a letter July 4 of the impending breakdown of the Geneva agreement to maintain peace in Laos.

Aug. 24—The building industry strike ends.

Aug. 27—The building industry wage dispute is settled, with a 3-year package contract covering some 1.2 million construction workers and providing for wage increases and for a reduction of the work week to 41 hours.

Aug. 28—British and Somali delegates meeting in Rome to discuss the disputed frontier on Kenya's northern border fail to reach agreement.

India

Aug. 6—Indian and Pakistani officials agree on a demarkation line on the West Bengal-East Pakistan border.

Aug. 21—In Bombay, over 30,000 municipal workers return to work after a 9-day strike for increased living allowances; the strikers have been promised by the Government and their union that "justice will be done."

Aug. 17—Replacing V. K. Krishna Menon, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, sister of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, will chair India's delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

Aug. 22—Nehru's Congress party defeats a motion of censure with a vote of 346 to 61 after four days of debate.

Aug. 24—Nehru reveals the resignation of 6 major Cabinet ministers and the chief ministers of 6 state governments in the biggest government reorganization since Indian independence. Those who have resigned will work to reorganize the Congress party.

Aug. 28—Replacing two Conservatives with middle of the road appointees and one middle of the road official with a leftist, Nehru changes the political complexion of his Cabinet.

Malaya

Aug. 5—Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal, Indonesian President Sukarno and Malayan Prime Minister Prince Abdul

Rahman agree to ask U.N. Secretary General U Thant to appoint a fact-finding commission to find out whether the recent elections in the British colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak honestly reflect the majority's wish to join the Malaysian Federation.

Aug. 12—U Thant names a 9-man fact finding mission to survey the wishes of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak.

Aug. 14—Voting 67 to 18, the Malayan Parliament approves the London agreement setting up the Federation of Malaysia.

Aug. 23—In response to a demand from Indonesia that 30 observers be sent into North Borneo and Sarawak from each of the Manila conference states, Britain offers to permit four observers from each state, each accompanied by a "junior assistant of a clerical grade," to watch the U.N. fact-finding team.

Aug. 29—The Government of Malaya proclaims that the Federation of Malaysia will be formed September 16 regardless of the U.N. fact finding commission's report. The report is expected to be published Sept. 14.

Aug. 31—Singapore declares itself completely independent and Sarawak and North Borneo effect internal self-government as a prelude to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia.

Pakistan

Aug. 29—Pakistan signs a treaty to provide scheduled air service with Communist China; Pakistan is the first Western-oriented nation to sign such a pact. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, Aug. 30.)

BRITISH EMPIRE

Malta

Aug. 1—British Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Secretary Duncan Sandys tells Commons that the Government will grant Malta independence by May 31, 1964, whether or not Maltese political leaders have agreed on a constitution.

Singapore

(See *Malaya*, above)

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Aug. 15—A Peking radio broadcast reports a government statement charging that the Soviet Union broke its promise 4 years ago to help China develop atomic weapons. The broadcast also repeats China's opposition to the nuclear test ban treaty.

COLOMBIA

Aug. 7—Armed Forces Chief Major General Gabriel Reveiz Pizarro announces that 7 "important persons," followers of ex-President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, have been arrested following the discovery of an anti-government conspiracy.

Aug. 8—Rojas Pinilla is arrested and charged with conspiracy.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Brazzaville)

Aug. 13—Striking workers march on the Brazzaville city jail, and free all the prisoners. The strikers battle police who unsuccessfully use guns, tear gas and grenades to halt them. The riot follows the calling of a general strike to protest graft and corruption in the government.

Aug. 14—President Fulbert Youlou announces that he will set up a new government. Youlou also declares that he will postpone the implementation of a law of April 13 to set up a single party state in the Congo (scheduled to become effective tomorrow).

Aug. 15—Some 10,000 demonstrators march outside the Presidential Palace; they demand Youlou's removal.

Youlou resigns. A provisional government will be headed by the Congolese army under Lieutenant Colonel René Jean.

Aug. 16—It is announced that last night a group of army officers and labor leaders appointed an 8-man provisional government. It will be led by Alphonse Massamba-Débat.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (LEOPOLDVILLE)

Aug. 2—The Belgian and Congo governments

reach agreement on an aid pact. Belgium will supply over \$1 billion in technical and investment aid.

Aug. 23—Soldiers are ordered into Leopoldville. The Secretary General of the Congolese Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Alphonse Kithima, tells workers negotiations with the government will halt unless the troops are withdrawn. The labor unions are threatening to call a civil servant strike on August 26.

Aug. 24—Kithima declares that the proposed strike by government workers has been averted because the government has agreed to meet union demands.

Aug. 26—In a radio address, President Joseph Kasavubu calls the parliament into special session as a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution.

CUBA

Aug. 17—The Cuban government reports that it has executed 3 persons captured July 22; Cuba charges that the 3 were agents of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Aug. 20—At his news conference, U.S. President Kennedy indicates that the number of Soviet troops in Cuba may have declined.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Aug. 8—*Rude Pravo* (Czech Communist party newspaper) reports that the former secretary general of the Czech Communist party, Rudolf Slansky, has been "juridically" rehabilitated by the Supreme Court. Slansky was executed in 1952 during a Stalinist purge.

Aug. 9—The Czech news agency reports that the Supreme Court has completely cleared Slansky and 8 others of all charges levied against them.

Aug. 22—CTK (official press agency) discloses that the report of the Communist party commission on the 1949-1954 trials did absolve Slansky of the crimes for which he was executed, but found him guilty of other crimes.

CTK announces that the Prague office of

Hsinhua (Communist Chinese press agency) has been closed by the Czech government for "inadmissible activities."

FINLAND

Aug. 30—The coalition government of Premier Ahti K. Karjalainen resigns following a Cabinet disagreement on how to finance increases in farmers incomes.

FRANCE

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy* and *Vietnam*.)

Aug. 9—France and Tunisia sign an agreement whereby France will provide \$38 million in credits to Tunisia for 1963.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *Intl. Disarmament*)

Aug. 4—U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara cancels plans to end a 4-day visit to West Germany. He will confer tomorrow with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer; informed sources report that they will discuss Western policy and the nuclear test ban treaty.

Aug. 10—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk stops in Bonn en route home from Moscow.

GREECE

Aug. 22—The 80 Center Union party deputies in the House walk out. Center Union leader George Papandreou charges that the caretaker government under Premier Panayotis Pipinelis has not acted to guarantee free and honest elections scheduled for November 3. On August 21, 20 United Democratic Left (pro-Communist) party deputies staged a walkout for like reasons.

HAITI

Aug. 5—It is reported that an invasion force of Haitian exiles led by General Leon Cantave has landed in the Bay of Liberté, and that the rebels have seized 3 towns.

Aug. 6—At an emergency session of the O.A.S. Council, Haiti's representative, Fern D. Baguidi, charges that the Dominican government is aiding the rebel troops in Haiti.

Aug. 15—An inter-American fact-finding

committee reports to the O.A.S. The committee suggests that the Dominican Republic restrict the activities of Haitian exiles.

Aug. 17—Government forces attack rebels in the mountain area near the Dominican border. A spokesman for the rebels states that the rebels are being led by General Leon Cantave; they have retreated higher into the mountains after 2 days of battle with government troops.

Aug. 23—Meeting in special session, the legislature approves the suspension of the constitutional guarantees of individual rights and grants extraordinary powers for 6 months to President Francois Duvalier. A decree to deprive opponents of the government of their property, citizenship and rights is also passed.

The Haitian government declares that the rebel forces in the mountains have all been forced to retreat behind the Dominican frontier.

INDONESIA

Aug. 17—At the eighteenth anniversary celebration of Indonesia's independence, President Sukarno declares that Indonesia's revolution can now focus on economic questions because Indonesia is no longer totally involved in maintaining internal and external security.

IRAQ

(See also *Israel*.)

Aug. 9—Iraq and Syria issue a joint communiqué stating that they are in agreement on ending the crisis in Arab relations. Syrian and Iraqi representatives urge U.A.R. President Nasser to cooperate in improving inter-Arab relations.

Aug. 18—It is reported that the leader of the Kurdish rebels, General Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, has refused an Iraqi government proposal on settling their differences.

Aug. 21—Iraqi President Abdel Salam Arif arrives in the U.A.R. for talks with President Nasser on reviving unity plans among Syria, Iraq and the U.A.R.

Aug. 26—A communiqué is issued after 5

days of talks between Nasser and Arif. It expresses the 2 leaders' agreement that the progress of Arab unity should not be allowed to wither. Arif leaves for Syria.

ISRAEL

Aug. 20—Israeli and Syrian forces battle along the demilitarized zone north of the Sea of Galilee. Yesterday 2 Israelis were killed by Syrian troops that crossed into Israel north of the Sea of Galilee. The Israeli government asks that the U.N. Security Council meet to consider Israeli charges against Syria. (See also *Intl, U.N.*)

Aug. 21—The Middle East News Agency reports that the Arab League is meeting to consider a "unified Arab plan" after Syria files a complaint against Israel with the League.

It is reported that the U.A.R. has placed its troops on alert for possible support of Syria in her fight with Israel. An Iraqi statement announces that Iraqi forces have been placed "at the disposal of" Syria.

Aug. 23—U.N. Secretary General U Thant tells the Security Council that Israel and Syria have accepted a U.N. ceasefire.

Aug. 25—Israeli and Jordanian troops in Jerusalem open fire on one another. An Israeli soldier is killed. U.N. truce observers persuade both sides to agree to a ceasefire.

KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Aug. 3—The U.N. Command in Korea warns North Korea against taking aggressive actions in the truce zone area between North and South Korea. The U.N. warns that it may be provoked into retaliatory measures.

Aug. 5—Communist North Koreans attack a U.S. post at the demilitarized zone border.

Aug. 11—Ex-Premier Song Yo Chan is arrested 3 days after he published an open letter criticizing the head of the ruling junta, General Chung Hee Park.

Aug. 15—A spokesman for the government declares that deposed President Syngman

Rhee may return to Korea from his exile in Hawaii.

Aug. 17—Song Yo Chan is released from prison on a writ of habeas corpus.

Aug. 31—The pro-government Democratic Republican party, at its convention, nominates General Chung Hee Park, head of the ruling junta, as presidential candidate in the October 15 election. Park retired from the army yesterday.

LAOS

Aug. 16—The head of the pro-Communist Pathet Lao, Prince Souphanouvong, rejects the latest plans for a peace settlement proposed by Premier Souvanna Phouma.

NORWAY

Aug. 23—Parliament adopts a no confidence motion, 76-74, to defeat the government of Premier Einar Gerhardsen. For the first time in 28 years the Labor party has been ousted.

Aug. 24—Premier Gerhardsen resigns. King Olav V asks John Lyng, leader of the 29 Conservative party members in parliament, to form a government.

Aug. 27—The new 4-party coalition government led by Premier John Lyng takes office.

PARAGUAY

Aug. 15—General Alfredo Stroessner is sworn in for a third term (of 6 years) as president. He addresses parliament and welcomes the new 20 Opposition deputies.

PERU

Aug. 12—Following peasants' invasions of rural estates, it is reported that the government has reached an agreement with landholders to expropriate nearly 50,000 acres of grazing land to be distributed mainly among Indian peasant communities.

Aug. 14—It is revealed that President Fernando Belaunde Terry has submitted an agrarian reform bill to Congress that provides for lands to be expropriated and divided among small tenants or Indian groups.

Aug. 20—It is reported that last night the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate approved the government's reform program, which will be aided by the Alliance for Progress.

Aug. 24—The U.S. coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, Teodoro Moscoso, arrives in Peru to discuss aid projects.

Aug. 30—Ending a week's visit, Moscoso declares that there is a "real spirit of reform" in Peru's government.

PORTUGAL

Aug. 12—Premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar declares that Portugal will not give up her rights in her overseas territories. Last week the U.N. Security Council asked Portugal to help her African territories become independent. Salazar criticizes the Soviet Union and the U.S. and charges them with trying to "capture and control markets" in Africa.

Aug. 16—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk replies to Salazar's charges, expressing U.S. displeasure.

Aug. 27—In Lisbon, a crowd of 250,000 gathers from all over the nation and the overseas territories to demonstrate support for Salazar's colonial policies.

Portuguese Guinea

Aug. 21—Reports from Conakry, Guinea, disclose fighting between Portuguese Guinea rebels and Portuguese soldiers; the soldiers have been forced to retreat.

SOMALIA

(See also *Brit. Commonwealth, Great Britain.*)

Aug. 17—The Somali government accuses Ethiopia of carrying out reprisals against Somali residents in the Ogaden section of Ethiopia in an effort to repress a Somali independence movement.

It is announced that the U.S. will supply "certain defensive weapons" to Somalia.

SPAIN

Aug. 8—Following a government order last night to close 7 coal mines to break a 3-

week old strike in the Asturias region, some 7,000 coal miners are out of work.

Aug. 10—The Spanish government announces plans to grant some autonomy to the 2 provinces, Rio Muni and Fernando Po island, that comprise Spanish Guinea.

SYRIA

(See also *Iraq and Israel.*)

Aug. 4—It is announced that a new cabinet has been formed by Premier Salah el-Bitar. The Baathists and the Independent Unionists will share an equal number of cabinet posts.

Aug. 6—A delegation led by Premier el-Bitar arrives in Iraq to discuss Arab unity.

U.S.S.R., THE

(See also *Int'l, Disarmament and Yugoslavia.*)

Aug. 4—*Pravda, Izvestia* and other Moscow papers publish a 5,000 word government statement decrying Communist Chinese opposition to the nuclear test ban.

Aug. 9—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other U.S. officials, who remained in Moscow after the signing of the test ban, meet with Khrushchev at the Soviet leader's vacation estate at Gagra on the Black Sea.

Aug. 10—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) announces that Pavel G. Romanov (top Soviet censor) has been named a minister in charge of the newly created Union Republican Publishing Committee to "improve guidance" of the publishing and printing industries.

Aug. 17—It is reported from Moscow that there may be some relaxation of restrictions on artists and writers. A new short story by Aleksandr Solzhenitzin (author of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich") and a speech critical of "Soviet realism" in the arts by novelist Ilya Ehrenburg have been published recently.

Aug. 21—The Soviet government refuses to accept a statement by West Germany explaining its position in signing the nuclear test ban treaty; the West German statement declares that West Germany represents all the German people.

Aug. 24—*Izvestia* (Soviet government newspaper) reports that yesterday the Soviet Union sent notes to the U.S. and Britain, stating that it regards East Germany as a "full and equal" participant in the nuclear test ban treaty. Previously the U.S. refused to accept a Soviet note advising that East Germany had signed the pact. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Aug. 30—The "hot line" direct communications link between Moscow and Washington becomes operational.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(See also *Iraq, Israel and Yemen*.)

Aug. 11—Nasser greets troops returning from Yemen. He declares that U.A.R. troops form a "national shield" against Israel.

Aug. 12—Minister of Industry Aziz Sidky lists 240 light industry and business services companies affected by today's nationalization order.

Aug. 21—Iraqi President Abdel Salam Arif arrives in Cairo for talks with Nasser.

Aug. 22—The Middle East News Agency reports that U.A.R. forces have been alerted for possible support of Syria in her fight with Israel.

UNITED STATES

The Economy

Aug. 1—The Department of Labor reports that there were 70.8 million employed persons in July, a record total; net unemployment totals remain stationary, because of the large numbers seeking employment.

Foreign Policy

Aug. 1—It is revealed in Moscow that Secretary of State Dean Rusk will extend his Russian visit 3 or 4 days to visit as the guest of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

At his press conference, President Kennedy notes that Communist China could create "a potentially more dangerous situation in the 1970's than any we faced since the end of the second war."

Aug. 2—The President accepts the resignation of the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, Joseph S. Farland.

Aug. 6—The U.S. government publishes a list of 19 products imported from Common Market nations from which it will select commodities for tariff increases. The Government hopes to discourage American purchases in order to reduce Common Market sales in the U.S. by some \$46 million yearly; this is the value it sets on poultry exports it expects to lose because of Common Market tariff policies.

It is reported in Washington that French President Charles de Gaulle has formally rejected President Kennedy's offer to negotiate with France on the development of a French national nuclear striking force in exchange for French signing of the limited nuclear test ban treaty.

Aug. 7—Ambassadors of the United States and Communist China meet in Warsaw for more than 3 and one half hours, in the longest session of their 8-year long series of diplomatic talks.

Aug. 13—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara gives "unequivocal support" to the nuclear test ban treaty.

Aug. 14—The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously approve ratification of the nuclear test ban agreement.

Aug. 15—The State Department reveals that 19 Cuban refugees were seized from a British island in the Caribbean by a Cuban air and naval force on August 13.

Aug. 16—The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. release the text of an agreement for cooperation in space projects involving weather and communications satellites; final approval of the agreement was given by the U.S. July 8 and by the U.S.S.R. August 1.

Canada and the U.S. complete an agreement for joint control of nuclear weapons that will arm the Canadian air defense system. The warheads will remain under U.S. control on Canadian soil and will be turned over to Canada in the event of hostilities.

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells a press conference that an agreement with the U.S.S.R. to prevent surprise attack may be the next step in reducing East-West tensions.

Aug. 19—Commander of the Strategic Air Force (SAC) Thomas S. Power opposes the test ban treaty in a closed session of the Senate Preparedness subcommittee; of the 9 unified commands of the U.S. forces, Powers is the only commander opposing the treaty.

Aug. 21—The State Department charges that the government of South Vietnam has broken its pledges to pursue a conciliatory policy with the Buddhists. (See also *South Vietnam*.)

Aug. 24—It is reported in Washington that Britain and the U.S. will formally reject the Soviet protest of their refusal to recognize East Germany's signature on the nuclear test ban treaty. (See also *Intl, Disarmament*.)

Aug. 30—In Washington, foreign aid officials report that a \$4.3 million airport loan for Pakistan has been deferred because of the Pakistani-Communist Chinese aviation agreement signed Aug. 29. (See also *British Commonwealth, Pakistan*.)

Government

Aug. 1—President Kennedy tells his news conference he is allocating \$250,000 from the Presidential Emergency Fund to pay guidance counselors to persuade potential school dropouts to continue their education.

Aug. 7—Patrick Bouvier Kennedy, the President's second son, is born prematurely.

Aug. 8—President Kennedy sends the nuclear test ban treaty to the Senate, urging approval.

A special study group set up by the Securities and Exchange Commission reports that contractual mutual fund plan salesmen high pressure investors; it is suggested that the S.E.C. consider making this type of mutual fund illegal. New S.E.C. regulations are to grow out of the staff report.

Aug. 9—Patrick Bouvier Kennedy dies of a lung ailment.

Aug. 10—Tennessee's Senator Estes Kefauver (Democrat) dies suddenly at the age of 60.

The Federal Trade Commission rules

that the 6 largest national drug companies have conspired to fix prices on the antibiotic tetracycline.

Aug. 12—The Administration sends Congress a revised program for tax reduction.

Aug. 13—A presidential advisory panel suggests that the salaries of Cabinet officers should be doubled (from \$25,000 to \$50,000 yearly) and that the salaries of members of Congress should be raised from \$22,500 to \$35,000.

Aug. 15—Yeoman First Class Nelson C. Drummond is sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiring to spy for the U.S.S.R.

Aug. 17—The Food and Drug Administration suggests that the government ban from the market common cold preparations that contain bacteria-killing antibiotics.

Aug. 20—Tennessee's Governor Frank G. Clement appoints Herbert Walters to the Senate seat vacant since the death of Estes Kefauver.

President Kennedy tells a news conference that he does not approve of racial employment quotas.

The Senate sends the White House a bill extending the temporary national debt limit of \$309 billion until November 30. The permanent limit is \$285 billion.

Aug. 23—The President denounces as "irresponsible and dangerously partisan" the House of Representatives' cut of \$585 million in the foreign aid authorization recommended by its Foreign Affairs Committee.

Aug. 31—The White House reveals that the President will make a 5-day trip to 10 states to inspect national conservation areas late in September.

Labor

Aug. 4—Negotiators at the Shell Oil Company's Houston, Texas, plant reach tentative agreement to settle a strike that began on August 18, 1962. The plant has continued to operate at nearly full capacity with 1,200 non-striking supervisors and technicians aided by automation, although only 48 of 2,200 workers have remained.

Aug. 16—Five train unions and the railroads

agree in principle to submit 2 major issues to binding decision by an arbitration board.

Aug. 21—Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz says that there are "irreconcilable differences" between labor and management over issues and procedures for voluntary arbitration of the rail dispute.

Aug. 24—Five railroad unions authorize a train strike for August 29.

Aug. 28—A bill barring a national railroad strike for 180 days and providing for arbitration of the work rules dispute is passed by Congress and signed by President Kennedy. This is the first time in U.S. history that Congress has imposed arbitration in a labor dispute.

Military Policy

Aug. 3—The Department of Defense gives up its plan to economize by rotating army units overseas without dependents after the failure of a trial series of troop shifts to Germany.

Aug. 10—In a news conference released today, Major General James H. Polk, U.S. Commandant in Berlin, reveals that the U.S. army garrison in West Berlin will be reduced by 600 men in September; new equipment will offset the manpower loss.

Aug. 22—The X-15 rocket research plane reaches a record altitude of 66.5 miles.

Aug. 24—The Defense Department reveals that President Kennedy has ordered an expanded underground nuclear testing program.

Segregation and Civil Rights

Aug. 1—Three federal judges order New Orleans, La., to desegregate the New Orleans Recreation Department and all public parks, playgrounds, community centers and cultural facilities.

Aug. 3—California's Governor Edmund G. Brown signs an executive order setting up a code of fair practices to abolish racial and religious discrimination by the state's government and its outside contractors.

Some 685 demonstrators are arrested in Gadsden, Alabama, after a crowd of some 1,000 Negroes protests against segregation.

Aug. 8—The Southern Education Reporting Service reports in *Southern School News* that 113 districts in 10 states are scheduled to desegregate for the first time in September, 1963; 1,092 out of 3,053 school districts in the 17-state region will be desegregated. Of the newly desegregated districts, 95 are acting voluntarily and 18 are obeying federal court orders.

Aug. 12—A federal appeals court rules that Virginia's Court of Appeals must rule on the legality of Prince Edward County's closed public schools before the federal courts can act. The Virginia court is to consider the case in October.

Aug. 13—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. executive council fails to endorse the August 28 civil rights march on Washington; it says it shares the purpose of the organization sponsoring the march.

A Federal district judge orders the Macon, Georgia, County School Board to submit a plan for desegregation by December 12 to begin January, 1964.

Aug. 14—Virginia's Governor Albertis S. Harrison, Jr., reveals plans to provide schooling for 1,700 Negro children in Prince Edward County, which closed its public schools to avoid integration four years ago. The schools will be run by the privately financed Prince Edward Free School Association.

Aug. 19—A plan to desegregate the twelfth grade of Birmingham's all-white schools starting in September, 1963, is approved by a federal judge.

Aug. 22—Fourteen public schools in Charleston, South Carolina, are ordered desegregated in September, 1963, by a federal judge.

In New York city, civil rights leaders reveal plans to call for a city-wide boycott of the public schools when school opens, to protest racial imbalances.

Aug. 23—The New Jersey State Board of Education approves the Englewood Board of Education's plan to reduce racial imbalance in its public elementary schools.

Aug. 25—The 10 chairmen of the August 28

civil rights march on Washington ask for a "disciplined and purposeful" assembly.

Aug. 28—A crowd of more than 200,000 demonstrates without incident in Washington, D.C., "for jobs and freedom" for Negro Americans.

President Kennedy meets for an hour with the 10 leaders of the march on Washington; he says that "very strong bipartisan support" is necessary for the passage of federal civil rights legislation in 1963.

Some 400 Negro children register at 8 formerly all-white schools in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Grade-by-grade desegregation has now reached the fourth grade.

A plan for ending racial imbalance in its Oakwood School is adopted by the Orange, New Jersey, Board of Education.

Aug. 29—The state of New Jersey approves the Orange school board plan, thus restoring state aid to the schools of Orange. Aid has been withheld pending an acceptable plan for school integration.

A Powhatan (Virginia) school is integrated quietly with more than 12 Negroes attending this previously all-white school.

Aug. 30—Four public schools are desegregated in Charleston, South Carolina, with the entry of 11 Negroes into previously all-white schools. These are the first schools in the state to be desegregated.

VATICAN, THE

Aug. 18—Visiting a Greek Orthodox monastery near Rome, Pope Paul VI urges the Eastern Church to settle its differences with the Roman Catholic Church so that the two may unite under a common creed.

VENEZUELA

Aug. 12—U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk orders that General Marcos Perez Jimenez, former president of Venezuela, be extradited. Perez Jimenez, who has taken refuge since 1958 in the U.S., faces embezzlement charges involving over \$13 million.

Aug. 16—Perez Jimenez is placed in the custody of Venezuelan authorities in Miami; he is flown to Venezuela.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Aug. 3—President Ngo Dinh Diem's sister-in-law, Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu, makes a speech accusing the Buddhist leaders of murder and Communist tactics. Although the ruling family are Roman Catholics, 70 per cent of the South Vietnamese are Buddhists.

Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother and adviser to the President, warns that if the religious protests continue, there will be a "coup d'état" followed by anti-Buddhist repression.

Aug. 4—A 21-year-old Buddhist priest, Nguyen Huong, burns himself to death to protest the government's policies.

Aug. 6—U.S. army sources report that last week some 90 pro-Communist Viet Cong guerrillas were killed by government forces.

Aug. 7—Mrs. Nhu accuses the U.S. Embassy of trying to "shut me up."

Aug. 13—A 17-year-old Buddhist student priest immolates himself to protest the government's religious policies.

Aug. 14—Using steel helmets as weapons, soldiers fight with Buddhists over possession of the body of the priest who committed suicide.

Aug. 16—A 71-year old Buddhist monk burns himself to death. Yesterday a Buddhist nun burnt herself to death.

At a news conference, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk declares that he hopes the Vietnamese government will settle its fight with the Buddhists.

Aug. 17—At the University of Hué, 47 faculty members resign after the rector of the government-run university is dismissed. It is reported that the dismissal resulted from student involvement in anti-government demonstrations.

Aug. 18—Some 15,000 Buddhists gather at the Xa Loi pagoda and promise to fast as an anti-government protest. They sit for 12 hours outside the pagoda.

Aug. 20—Viet Cong rebels attack and burn many homes in Ben Tuong hamlet, part of the U.S. Operation Sunrise project.

Aug. 21—Policemen and soldiers using pistols,

tear gas and hand grenades enter 4 pagodas in Saigon. At the Xa Loi pagoda some 100 Buddhist monks are arrested.

Martial law is imposed throughout Vietnam. It is reported that police and soldiers have attacked Buddhist pagodas throughout Vietnam, and arrested Buddhist priests.

Aug. 22—South Vietnamese Ambassador to the U.S. Tran Van Chuong (father of Mrs. Nhu) resigns in protest against his government. His wife resigns as Vietnam's permanent observer at the U.N. Buddhist Foreign Minister Vu Van Mau also resigns.

Aug. 24—Brigadier General Ton That Dinh declares that Saigon university and all public and private secondary schools are closed.

Aug. 25—Police and troops arrest an estimated 600 students in Saigon; students also have begun to criticize and demonstrate against the government.

Aug. 26—A U.S. State Department statement declares that Vietnam's military leaders were not responsible for the attacks on Buddhist pagodas last week. The statement indirectly places the responsibility with Ngo Dinh Nhu.

Aug. 27—The Government issues a communiqué declaring that the military proposed the attacks on the Buddhist temples, and is responsible for "all measures to accomplish this mission."

Aug. 29—It is reported that U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge has refused to surrender 2 Buddhists who have taken refuge in a U.S. office. Reliable sources reveal that Lodge has been told that the students and Buddhist priests arrested last week have been set free.

A statement made at a Cabinet meeting by French President de Gaulle on the Vietnam crisis is released for official publication by Minister of Information Alain Peyrefitte. The statement expresses French willingness to assist Vietnam in her efforts to become "unified and truly independent"; it urges Vietnam to make an effort to gain "independence from exterior influences."

Aug. 30—Viet Cong guerrillas shoot down a U.S. helicopter, killing 2 American pilots

and injuring 3 other U.S. crewmen.

Aug. 31—A government sponsored rally in support of Diem is held in Saigon. It is reported that the 30,000-40,000 in attendance were soldiers in civilian dress or members of government controlled groups.

YEMEN

(See also U.A.R.)

Aug. 8—It is reported that last night Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer, deputy commander of the U.A.R. armed forces, told President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Presidential Council that the military offensive in Yemen has ended and that Yemeni and Egyptian troops have "complete control of the situation" in Yemen. Some 3,500 U.A.R. troops are scheduled to return home on August 11.

YUGOSLAVIA

Aug. 11—U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman meets with President Tito. Freeman tells Tito that the U.S. will provide a \$25 million loan and \$25 million in direct aid to Yugoslavia for relief of the victims of the Skoplje earthquake last month.

Aug. 20—Soviet Premier Khrushchev arrives in Yugoslavia to visit Tito. Khrushchev declares that his 15-day visit will help strengthen "friendship and cooperation" between the 2 countries.

Aug. 21—Khrushchev visits an automobile and tractor factory. In a speech, Khrushchev praises the workers' councils and says that the Soviet Union will look into them further as a means of democratizing "the management of enterprises" in the U.S.S.R. Yugoslav workers' councils are elected managerial committees governing individual factories.

Aug. 27—After 2 days of official talks on Brioni Island between Khrushchev and Tito and their delegations, a communiqué is issued. The communiqué states that the 2 Communist leaders have discussed Soviet-Yugoslav ties and Socialist unity, and have reached "agreement on substantive questions of international development."

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